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This thesis sheds light on the behaviour of banks, the main providers of financial 
services for households and firms in the euro area. The analysis spans both structural and 
cyclical topics including the determinants of banks’ capital decisions (Chapter 1), assessing 
the degree of competition (Chapter 2), efficiency and productivity (Chapter 3) as well as the 
transmission of monetary policy (Chapter 4). It therefore covers both topics associated with 
banks’ decisions and with market equilibrium outcomes. Other important topics, including 
the relationship between bank lending and economic growth, are outside the scope of this 
work. 
The first three chapters use the Portuguese banking system as a case-study, based on a 
unique dataset of supervisory data. The analysis starts from the early 1990s, thereby 
including the process of liberalization, consolidation and financial innovation. The first 
chapter investigates why banks hold significant capital buffers above the required regulatory 
minimum, despite evidence that capital is a relatively expensive source of financing when 
compared to deposits or bonds. The second chapter assesses how the competitive behaviour 
of Portuguese banking groups in the loan market has evolved through time and investigates 
for cross-sectional heterogeneity across different types of banks. The third chapter analyses 
the production technology of Portuguese banks. It explores how the changes in the banking 
system following the country’s euro area accession reflected in developments in marginal 
costs, scale economies, cost efficiency and overall productivity. 
The last chapter focuses on the transmission of monetary policy, and in particular on the 
role of the portfolio rebalancing channel in the transmission of large scale asset purchase 
programmes. The analysis is based on recent evidence for the euro area and investigates 
whether the ECB’s expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) led investors to rebalance 
their bond portfolios towards riskier assets and, in the case of banks, towards lending to the 
real economy. Identification is based on cross-sectional information, using a unique granular 
dataset on security holdings for the institutional sectors of each euro area country and for the 










The purpose of this paper is to shed light on why Portuguese banks hold significant 
capital buffers above the required regulatory minimum, despite the fact that capital is a 
relatively expensive source of financing compared to deposits or bonds. The level of banks’ 
capital buffers is found to be positively influenced by several broad risk measures, indicating 
that banks tend to hold extra capital in order to cover for increased risk. Loan loss provisions 
and high and stable profitability are found to be substitutes for capital buffers. Larger banks 
seem to hold less excess capital, which could be linked with higher portfolio diversification 
and technological advantages in screening and monitoring activities, but also with moral 
hazard associated with higher expectations of public support against the background of the 
“too-big-to-fail” hypothesis. A negative business cycle effect is also found, suggesting that 
the lending cycle may be pro-cyclical. 
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Since the mid 1980’s, there has been an increasing effort to decrease the distortionary 
effects of excessive regulation in the Portuguese banking sector, following the revolution 
(1974) and nationalization of Portuguese banks (1975). However, it was not until the early 
1990’s that credit ceilings were abolished and deposit rates were fully liberalized. This 
period has also hosted full entry liberalization and the beginning of privatizations, which 
lasted until 1996. Hence, during the early 1990’s, the Portuguese banking sector has met 
greater sophistication through market segmentation, risk differentiation and increased 
competition, which allowed for considerable efficiency gains. 
In this context of decreasing direct controls on banks’ conduct, capital adequacy 
regulation has become relatively more important. As established in the 1988 Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel I), each bank is required to hold at least 8% of its Risk Weighted Assets 
(RWA) in capital. Most banks’ solvency ratios are well above the regulatory minimum and a 
better understanding of the determinants of these capital buffers in one regulatory regime 
may shed light on the relevance and desirability of changes in the regulatory framework. On 
the other hand, it may make it easier to assess the factors underlying banks’ solvency ratios. 
The main findings of the analysis are that the magnitude of banks’ capital buffers is 
positively influenced by several broad risk measures, indicating that banks tend to hold extra 
capital in order to cover for increased risk. Loan loss provisions and high and stable 
profitability are found to be substitutes for capital buffers. Larger banks seem to hold less 
excess capital, which could be linked with higher portfolio diversification and technological 
advantages in screening and monitoring activities, but also with moral hazard associated 
with higher expectations of public support against the background of the “too-big-to-fail” 
hypothesis. A negative business cycle effect is also found. While this may be a desirable 
result from a micro-prudential perspective, it also suggests that the lending cycle may be 
pro-cyclical. 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some hypotheses to be 
examined; section 3 summarizes previous empirical findings on the subject; section 4 
presents the data; section 5 presents the model to be estimated; section 6 discusses estimation 





The reasoning behind capital adequacy regulation is that banks should hold enough 
capital in order to assure that failure risk is minimal. This is important due to the negative 
externalities bank failures impose on their depositors and the potential for moral hazard in 
the behaviour of limited liability stockholders, but especially due to the possibility of 
generating systemic risk with severe effects to the real economy.
1
 
In this context, since solvency regulation in the framework of Basel I is generally 
acknowledged to have poor risk sensitivity, one would expect banks with higher risk to hold 
higher capital buffers.
2
 On the other hand, the literature suggests that capital is a relatively 
expensive source of financing when compared to deposits or bonds.
 3
 Hence, banks’ capital 
decisions reflect the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of holding excess capital 
(Milne and Whalley 2001). 
One of the main benefits of holding high capital buffers is lower failure costs due to a 
decrease in the probability of failure. On the other hand, a decrease in the capital ratio below 
the regulatory minimum would imply extra supervisory scrutiny which would in turn 
decrease bank value. Furthermore, adjustments to the capital level bare direct costs, i.e. the 
transaction costs of issuing and repurchasing shares, as well as indirect costs from the signals 
they send to markets – issuing new shares may be interpreted as a signal that shares are 
overvalued.
4
 Dietrich and Vollmer (2004) argue that banks use excess capital as a strategic 
tool which provides banks with increased bargaining power when renegotiating loans. In the 
context of asymmetric information, strong solvency ratios may also be interpreted as a signal 
of the bank’s low probability of failure. Hence, higher solvency ratios allow for better credit 
ratings, therefore decreasing the cost of financing and improving the bank’s reputation. In 
the presence of liquidity constraints, banks may also hold excess capital in order to provide 
for unexpected investment opportunities. The business cycle is also likely to impact banks’ 
capital buffers, as the value of capital as an insurance against failure should be higher during 
periods of increased credit risk and risk aversion.  
                                                          
1
   For a comprehensive discussion on the relevance of financial stability see Crockett, A. (1997). 
2
   See BCBS (1999). 
3
   Check Myers and Majluf (1984). 
4
 Cornett and Tehranian (1994) report statistically significant negative share price reactions to 




According to the “too big to fail” hypothesis, larger banks feel that authorities would 
support them if they faced difficulties due to the important externalities and contagion risk 
their failure would pose. This moral hazard effect makes big banks willing to purchase less 
insurance against failure. On the other hand, if portfolio diversification increases with bank 
size and is not captured by the risk measures, larger banks are less likely to experience large 
drops in their capital ratios.
5
 One may also consider the costs and benefits of screening and 
monitoring borrowers in order to better acknowledge their risk. If there are scale economies 
in screening and monitoring, one would expect larger banks to choose relatively more of 
these activities to the detriment of excess capital. As Alfon et al. (2004) remark, big banks 
may also be less liquidity constrained and/or have smaller costs in adjusting capital to 
optimum levels and thus issue comparatively more capital or debt on demand rather than 
hold large capital reserves. 
Overall, the main hypotheses to be tested can be summarized as follows: 
Hyp. 1: Banks’capital buffers are likely to be persistent; 
Hyp. 2: Higher risk should be associated with higher capital buffers; 
Hyp. 3: Other froms of addressing risk should be associated with lower capital buffers; 
Hyp. 4: Larger banks are likely to hold lower capital buffers; 
Hyp 5: The business cycle is likely to be negatively correlated with capital buffers. 
3. Previous Empirical Findings 
There is an extensive literature regarding banks’ solvency. However, most of it regards 
US banks and capital ratios rather than excess capital. The literature on the determinants of 
European banks’ capital buffers includes Stolz and Wedow (2005) for German banks, Ayuso 
et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b) for Spanish banks and Lindquist (2003) for 
Norwegian banks. To our knowledge there is no such work for Portuguese banks. A dynamic 
model is estimated in the first three papers, whereas Lindquist (2003) does not explicitly 
model for the persistence of the capital buffer, i.e. for adjustment costs in banks’ level of 
capital. 
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The conclusions on the effect of risk on capital buffers vary somewhat between models. 
Ayuso et al. (2002a) find a negative influence of non-performing loans on Spanish banks’ 
capital buffer, which the authors expected since this is an ex-post risk measure. Ayuso et al. 
(2002b) also find evidence of a negative relationship between non-performing loans and 
excess capital. However, they also find a negative impact of the loan growth rate (which may 
be interpreted as a measure of banks’ willingness to increase portfolio risk) and a positive 
impact of the share of risk free assets to total assets. These results suggest the counter-
intuitive interpretation that more risky banks tend to hold less insurance against default.
6
 
Lindquist (2003), using a more sophisticated measure of risk but a less sophisticated 
modelling approach, also finds a negative risk effect which the author did not expect. Stolz 
and Wedow (2005) find a positive relationship between banks’ liquidity and excess capital, 
which the authors argue may be interpreted as a positive risk effect as they proxy liquidity by 
banks’ holdings of shares and bonds, and capital buffers may be held in order to hedge for 
the corresponding market risk. 
Ayuso et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b) find a negative effect of the price of 
insurance, proxied by banks’ Return on Equity (ROE), in capital buffers. Lindquist (2003) 
finds the same result using the β-coefficient for the Norwegian banking industry as a proxy 
for the cost of excess capital, since it is a measure of the industry level risk premium. Being 
an industry level variable, this proxy has the obvious shortcoming of allowing for no cross-
section variation. Stolz and Wedow (2005) find a negative relationship between banks’ 
Return on Assets (ROA) and excess capital, suggesting that banks with high returns may use 
profits to increase capital and therefore need to hold smaller capital buffers as insurance. 
The four papers find a negative relationship between the business cycle and capital 
buffers. From a regulator’s perspective this may seem like a reassuring result as banks seem 
to protect themselves with higher excess capital during downturns, when loan default rates 
are higher. On the other hand, banks may increase excess capital during downturns through 
changes in their portfolio in order to reduce the risk weighted assets on which the regulatory 
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minimum level of capital is based.
7
 Hence, from a macroeconomic perspective, this 
behaviour may not be quite as desirable as it is likely to amplify rather than dampen business 
cycles, as during downturns firms are more likely to be denied credit (at a reasonable cost) 
which should increase bankruptcies.  
Stolz and Wedow (2005), Ayuso et al. (2002b) and Lindquist (2003) also find a negative 
effect of banks’ size on excess capital. Moreover, Lindquist (2003) finds a significant 
positive effect of competitors’ capital buffers which is interpreted as evidence of peer 
pressure as banks use solvency in order to signal the market of their credibility.
8
 However, 
this result must be interpreted with caution, since Lindquist (2003) does not include the 
lagged dependent variable in the model, which in the presence of persistence in capital 
buffers may make inference invalid.
9
 
4. The Data 
Estimation in the present study is based on an unbalanced panel of yearly data from 
banks’ financial statements reported to Banco de Portugal, Statistical Bulletins issued by 
Banco de Portugal and Reuters. Consolidated figures are used (except for banks that do not 
belong to any banking group and thus do not consolidate their data and variables for which 
data is only available on an individual basis) as capital requirements are imposed at the 
consolidated group level.
10
 The dataset used for estimation covers 17 Portuguese banks from 
1994 to 2004, though profitability data since 1993 was used. The choice of the period for 
analysis was made with the purpose of maximizing the number of observations while 
avoiding structural changes in the industry. Hence, by 1994 Portuguese banks had adapted to 
the regulatory framework developed in Basel I but by 2004 they had not yet started to adapt 
to the new Basel II rules. The first three observations of newly created banks were excluded 
in order to allow for some stabilization of their activity. Small banks specialized in 
investment banking were also excluded as they are likely to behave differently. 
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The capital buffer (BUF) is defined as the ratio between excess capital and the 
regulatory minimum. NPL1 is the ratio of non-performing loans overdue for less than one 
year to total loans and CREDG is the growth rate of total loans. PROV is the coverage ratio 
of non-performing loans by specific provisioning. ROE and ROA are each bank’s Return on 
Equity and Return on Assets, whereas CF is banks’ cash flow normalized by total assets. The 
variance of profits (VPROF) is the variance of banks’ past ROA and is computed using 
profits from the previous three years to the current year in order to obtain a meaningful 
measure of volatility while minimising the loss of observations. For the same reason, 
profitability data since 1993 is used. STK is the weight of volatile income financial assets in 
banks’ total assets and MKTD is the ratio of market debt (total liabilities deducted of 
deposits) to total liabilities. TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 to total own funds. Banks’ size 
(SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. PSIG is the change in the Lisbon 
Stock Exchange general index and is thus constant across banks. YGAP is a simple output 
gap measure obtained through the application of a Hodrick-Precott filter to the real output 
series.
11
 Since this filter is known to have a poor fit for the first and the last observation, it 
was applied to an output series covering more years than the sample. YGAP is defined as the 
ratio of output gap to potential output. MERGER is a dummy variable equal to one when a 
bank has been involved in a merger. Ratios and growth rates are defined in percentage 
points. 
Descriptive statistics of the included variables are presented in Table 1. With regard to 
the distribution of the capital buffer in the sample, it should be noted that its value for the 
largest banks (4
th
 quartile of total assets) is little above a third of the average buffer for the 
smallest banks in the sample (1
st
 quartile of total assets). As seen in Figure 1, the in-sample 
aggregate capital buffer tends to be somewhat lower than the banking system’s actual capital 
buffer. This difference may be explained by the fact that the banks that were eliminated from 
the sample – newly created banks and institutions with very specific activities – tend to have 
abnormally high levels of excess capital.  
From the beginning of the sample to the end of the past decade, capital buffers have 
declined as the economy recovered from the 1993 recession, credit accelerated and 
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decreased exchange rate risk due to the adoption of the Euro was anticipated. Furthermore, 
there was an historical excess of capital in the Portuguese banking system, and 
rationalization of its use increased during this period. From the turning of the millennium, as 
capital ratios approached the regulatory minimum and economic growth slowed down, the 
banking system’s aggregate capital buffer initiated a slow and steady recovery. 
 
5. The Model 
Considering the small size of the available sample, which makes it impossible to 
estimate a comprehensive general model, the option was to estimate a parsimonious model 
and then test additional hypotheses on the initial specification presented below: 
0 1 1 2 31it it it it itBUF BUF NPL PROV CREDG         
         4 5 6 7it it t it i itSTK SIZE YGAP MERGER              
(1) 
where δ is a constant term, ηi is an unobservable variable that captures idiosyncratic 
features of each institution that are constant over time and εi,t is a random shock 
The lagged dependent variable is intended to capture capital buffers’ persistence. As 
argued by Ayuso et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b), its coefficient may be interpreted 
as a measure of adjustment costs in capital buffers and its expected sign is thus positive. 
NPL1 is a credit risk measure that intends to capture the flow rather than the stock of non-
performing loans, thus decreasing (but not fully eliminating) the ex-post character of this 
variable. Hence, β1’s sign should depend on how much lag it has. If it still measures ex-post 
risk, a negative sign is expected as banks where higher credit risk has materialized are 
expected to have lower excess capital. If, on the other hand, it is a forward looking risk 
measure, and since the current solvency regulation is known to have poor risk sensitivity, 
one would expect a positive sign as banks with higher credit risk should, ceteris paribus, be 
willing to purchase more insurance. 
The coverage of non-performing loans by provisioning is expected to have a negative 




smaller capital buffers. Provisions are thus imperfect substitutes for capital as they are 
intended to cover expected rather than unexpected losses. 
The high credit growth observed during the sample period may have contributed to 
decrease capital buffers through a direct effect if banks have not anticipated this growth. On 
the other hand, one would expect a positive effect if banks anticipated high credit growth and 
responded to it with a precautionary excess capital increase. Furthermore, since an increase 
in granted loans is not expected to materialize immediately in an increase in non-performing 
loans, controlling for credit growth may be important for a correct interpretation of NPL1. 
Banks with a higher weight of stocks in their total assets are expected to hold higher 
capital buffers as their assets should be more volatile. As argued above, both banks’ size and 
the output gap are expected to have a negative impact on excess capital. 
A negative coefficient on MERGERi,t would suggest mergers consume capital, whereas 
a positive sign could be explained by precautionary behaviour or simply by the acquisition of 
a strongly capitalised bank. 
5.1. Additional variables tested 
a) ROAi,t/CFi,t  and VPROFi,t 
High and stable earnings are expected to decrease the level of excess capital as profits 
are the first line of defense against unexpected losses. 
b) PSIGt 
Good stock market performance should increase capital buffers as banks tend to choose 
these times to issue new capital and the value of banks’ capital should increase due to the 
likely increase in listed banks’ share price and the increase in profits from stock holdings. 
Hence, the hypothesis that the stock market effect is stronger for banks with a higher weight 





Higher cost of capital, proxied by banks’ Return on Equity (ROE), is expected to have a 
negative impact in capital buffers. 
d) TIER1i,t 
Banks with a higher ratio of Tier 1 to total own funds are expected to require smaller 
capital buffers as this ratio may not fall below 50%. Hence, for banks close to the minimum, 
a negative shock to Tier 1 capital will have a higher impact in the capital ratio as Tier 2 
capital will also decrease. Furthermore, banks close to the minimum allowed ratio should 
have higher capital adjustment costs as supplementary capital is cheaper and faster to issue 
than core capital. These effects should be reflected in capital buffers as they are not 
considered in the definition of the regulatory minimum capital. 
e) MKTDi,t 
Higher weight of market debt (total liabilities deducted of deposits) in total liabilities is 
expected to positively influence capital buffers as, on the one hand, banks should hedge for 
the increased exposure to liquidity risk and to changes in market sentiment, and on the other 
hand, banks with higher market debt should target higher credit ratings as the price of issued 




The main advantages of using panel data are capturing both cross-section and 
time-series variation as well as allowing for meaningful inference using a sample with a 
relatively small number of cross-section observations over a short time period. Allowing for 
dynamics in the underlying process is relevant not only to infer on the persistence of the 
series but also to ensure that the estimates for other parameters are consistent. 
In the estimation of dynamic models with a small number of time-series observations 
such as the ones described above, traditional estimation methods result in inconsistent 
estimates. Maximum Likelihood estimators may be inconsistent if the distribution of the 
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initial conditions is miss-specified.
13
 In fact, in panels with a small number of time-series 
observations, this estimator’s attractive properties depend on quite strong and un-testable 
assumptions. Direct Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation would also result in 
inconsistent estimates as 
, 1i tBUF   would be correlated with the error term , ,( )i t i i tv     due 
to the presence of time invariant individual effects. The Within Groups estimator solves for 
this source of inconsistency as it eliminates the fixed effects by transforming the variables 
into deviations from their means:  
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 in (3) will be correlated with , 1i tBUF   in (2).
 14
 
Application of OLS after taking first differences of the variables would still yield 
inconsistent estimates as the regressor , 1 , 1 , 2i t i t i tBUF BUF BUF      would be correlated 
with the error term , , , 1i t i t i t      . This problem may, however, be solved by using Two-
Stage Least Squares (TSLS) with instrumental variables that are both correlated with 
, 1i tBUF   and orthogonal to ,i t , as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) build on this approach by developing an asymptotically 
efficient estimator in a General Method of Moments (GMM) framework, using an 
instrument matrix of the form: 
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Where rows correspond to the first-differenced equations for periods t=3,4,…,T for 
individual i. 
However, as Arellano and Bover (1995) remark, in the presence of persistence in the 
dependent variable, lagged levels produce weak instruments for differences. Nevertheless, 
assuming lagged differences are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, one may explore 
additional moment conditions by estimating level equations using lagged differences as 
instruments. This is the intuition behind System GMM proposed in Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and which basically consists in estimating a system of both difference and level 
equations using lagged levels to instrument differences and lagged differences to instrument 
levels. System GMM thus allows for increased efficiency, especially when the dependent 
variable is persistent, which is likely to be the case with capital buffers.
15
 
There are one and two-step versions of this estimator. While the two-step version is 
asymptotically more efficient, its standard errors are known to be severely downward biased 
in finite samples.
16
 Hence the finite sample two-step covariance matrix correction developed 
in Windmeijer (2005) is used. 
Table 2 summarises the instruments used and the underlying assumption on the 
correlation of each regressor with the error term. Conservative assumptions have been made 
since they are relevant to the validity of the conclusions and not testable.
17
 
The use of too many instruments relative to the number of cross-section observations is 
known to overfit endogenous variables, thus creating biased estimates. Hence, rather than 
using all available lags to instrument each variable, regressions were first estimated using 
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one lag. The number of lags was then increased and the specification with the highest p-
value for the Hansen J test of overidentifiyng restrictions was chosen. To further address this 

























implying the use of one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one 
instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance. 
7. Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents Blundell-Bond two-step finite sample covariance matrix corrected 
System GMM estimates for the model presented in section 5 and a reduced model (1.A). 
Estimation was carried out in Stata 8.0 using the xtabond2 routine developed in Roodman 
(2005). The Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions is not significant in any of the 
specifications above, which means that there is no evidence that the instruments used are 
invalid. AR (1) and AR (2) are the application of the autocorrelation tests developed in 
Arellano and Bond (1991) to check for first and second order autocorrelation in the residuals 
of the differenced equations. The fact that there is evidence of first order but not second 
order autocorrelation implies that the model is well specified in levels, as expected. 
Furthermore, the F-test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero is safely 
rejected in both models. Since the coefficient in CREDGi,t  is not found to be statistically 




Capital buffers are found to be persistent as the coefficient in BUFi,t-1 is significant and 
positive, thus presenting evidence in favour of the adjustment cost hypothesis. There is 
statistically weak evidence of a negative relationship between NPL1i,t and excess capital, 
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which may suggest that this variable does not fully eliminate the ex-post character of the 
outstanding stock of non-performing loans or that credit risk is not a relevant determinant of 
banks’ capital buffers. This may be because the regulatory capital ratio already adjusts 
enough to cover the extra credit risk (which is unlikely) or because the precautionary effect 
of increasing capital buffers to cover credit risk is cancelled by the moral hazard and 
regulatory arbitrage effects described in Crocket (1997) that actually lead more risky banks 
to hold less excess capital. 
The negative coefficient in PROVi,t is consistent with the hypothesis that provisions are 
a substitute for capital buffers. The fact that banks with a higher weight of stocks in their 
total assets seem to hold higher capital buffers suggests that banks with higher exposure to 
market risk choose to hold more excess capital in order to cover for the excess risk not 
considered in the regulatory minimum requirements. As expected, a significant size effect is 
also found. However, no statistically significant effect of mergers is found, suggesting that 
mergers and acquisitions have not taken place at the expense of the overall system’s capital. 
Finally, as documented in the literature, a negative relationship between the output gap 
and capital buffers is found, which conveys that banks tend to cover the extra risk in cycle 
downturns with excess capital but also that the lending cycle may be pro-cyclical.  
7.1. Additional Hypotheses 
Since the variance of profits is a broad risk measure, the hypothesis that banks with 
higher and more stable profits require smaller capital buffers is tested on a model that does 
not include other risk measures. For increased robustness, income is measured both by ROA 
and by cash flow. Qualitatively, the conclusions are the same, confirming that banks with 
higher and less variable income do in fact tend to hold less excess capital. However, the 
coefficient in ROAi,t is statistically weaker than the one in CFi,t. The F-test for the hypothesis 
that both the coefficient in profitability and the one in profit volatility are zero is significant 
at 10% in model (a.1) and at 1% in model (a.2). 
Tests for the relevance of the growth of the PSI General stock market index were 




performance is strongly correlated with the business cycle.
19
 Statistically significant 
evidence of a positive effect of stock market performance in capital buffers was found, 
suggesting that banks tend to choose times of good stock market performance to issue new 
capital or that during these periods the value of banks’ capital is boosted by the likely 
increase in listed banks’ share price and the increase in profits from stock holdings. These 
conclusions must, however, be interpreted with care, as the result may be spurious if changes 
in PSIGt do not cause changes in BUFi,t-1 but, on the other hand, changes in the output gap 
cause changes both in capital buffers and in stock market performance.
20
 If it is true that the 
positive impact of PSIGt in BUFi,t-1 is related to impacts in profits from banks’ holdings of 
stocks, one would expect the effect to be larger for banks with a higher weight of stocks in 
their total assets. The positive but not statistically significant coefficient in PSIG*STKi,t 
provides weak evidence for this hypothesis.  
No significant effect of the cost of capital, proxied by ROE, was found. This may be 
related to the fact that the cost of capital is an adjustment cost to the capital buffer, since 
these costs are already taken into consideration through the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. Furthermore, ROEi,t is measured in book-values whereas the true cost of 
capital is related to the market value of banks’ return on equity.
21
 
The negative but statistically weak effect of the ratio of Tier 1 to total capital provides 
weak evidence for the hypothesis presented in 5.1 d). Weak evidence is also found for the 
hypothesis that banks with a higher ratio of market to total debt hold higher capital buffers. 
Furthermore, this effect seems to be present only in the 94% larger banks.
22
 
Given the small sample size, it is reassuring to note that the sign and significance of 
most coefficients remains stable across a wide range of specifications.
23
 The effect of NPL1, 
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 Check the correlation matrix of the variables in the Appendix. 
20
 In fact, a regression of PSIGt on a constant and YGAPt-1 yields a significant coefficient on YGAPt-1 
whereas a regression of YGAPt on PSIGt-1 does not, suggesting that the business cycle determines stock market 
performance but the opposite is not true. 
21
 It is, however, impossible to compute banks’ market value return on equity, as there are no estimates for 
most Portuguese banks’ market value of equity. 
22
 Evidence for this fact is once again weak as the hypothesis that both MKTD1i,t and MKTD*SIZEi,t are 
zero may not be rejected. 
23
 In fact, estimation by Generalized Least Squares assuming Random Effects – the methodology used in 




however, is not robust to the different specifications, suggesting that either banks do not 
adjust their capital buffers to credit risk or this variable is still a poor proxy for expected 
credit risk. Possible differences between domestic and foreign owned banks were also 
investigated through the inclusion of a dummy variable. However, this feature has not shown 
to be relevant. 
8. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was investigating which factors determine Portuguese 
banks’ capital buffers, through the estimation of a dynamic panel data model. 
Observed persistence in capital buffers suggests that there are relevant adjustment costs 
in banks’ excess capital. On the other hand, high and stable profits and more conservative 
provisioning policies were found to be imperfect substitutes for higher capital. A statistically 
weak and not robust negative credit risk effect was found, suggesting that the credit risk 
proxy used does not fully eliminate the ex-post character of the proxies used in the literature. 
The intuitive and reassuring result of a positive risk effect was found for broad measures of 
asset risk and for the weight of market liabilities. Hence, these measures of risk seem to be 
relevant for the definition of the optimum capital level of banks. Rating objectives also seem 
to have a positive effect on capital buffers, a hypothesis which had been previously 
discussed in the literature but not explicitly tested. The hypothesis that larger banks tend to 
hold less excess capital was also confirmed. 
The business cycle was found to have a negative effect implying that banks protect 
themselves when higher credit risk materializes, but also that their optimal choice of capital 
may amplify economic cycles. On the other hand, banks’ capitalisation is positively related 
to the performance of stock markets.  
These findings allow for a better understanding of the factors underlying changes in 
banks’ capital buffers and provide a better basis for the discussion about regulatory changes 
in this field. These findings allow for a better understanding of the factors underlying 
changes in capital reserves of Portuguese banks and provide a better basis for the discussion 
about regulatory changes in this field. In particular, obtained results confirm the idea that 




those directly resulting from changes in the macroeconomic environment throughout the 
cycle, and those resulting from banks’ own decisions. However, it should be noted that with 
the analysis undertaken, it is not possible to identify the effects of the regulator’s explicit and 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BUFi,t-1 152 46.297 37.591 1.180 208.430
NPL1i,t 152 1.046 0.942 0.000 7.076
PROVi,t 148 65.626 15.407 0.000 100.000
CREDGi,t 135 19.313 28.757 -51.660 148.769
STKi,t 152 2.902 2.526 0.009 12.153
SIZEi,t 152 15.425 1.598 11.561 18.122
YGAPt 187 0.588 2.430 -2.378 4.392
ROAi,t 162 0.873 1.437 -0.080 10.970
CFi,t 152 2.197 2.260 0.100 17.050
VPROFi,t 111 0.212 0.721 0.000 4.421
PSIGt 187 11.627 23.895 -20.700 65.200
PSIG*STKi,t 152 32.514 113.030 -180.393 792.372
ROEi,t 152 9.186 6.490 -4.154 32.791
TIER1i,t 152 74.982 13.722 50.000 100.000
MKTDi,t 152 42.554 24.492 11.006 100.000
MKTD*SIZEi,t 152 642.570 326.752 162.142 1363.399
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
NOTE: ROA covers the  period 1993-2004 while the remaining variables cover 1994-2004

























0.260 (0.98) 0.396 (1.84)*
-11.478 (-1.64) -8.196 (-1.43)
-1.125 (-2.07)* -1.013 (-2.49)**
0.249 (0.78)  
11.457 (1.97)* 16.315 (2.03)*
-20.989 (-2.69)** -21.193 (-4.49)***
-2.372 (-2.92)*** -2.089 (-2.73)**
-6.440 (-0.60) 3.136 (0.39)
409.801 (2.55)** 387.258 (4.88)***
NOTES: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test.


















Model (1) Model (1.A)
0.695 0.705
Variable
BUFi,t-1 0.748 (11.76)*** 0.675 (7.82)*** 0.396 (1.92)* 0.358 (2.67)**
NPL1i,t -1.632 (-0.25) -5.589 (-1.31)
PROVi,t -0.986 (-2.32)** -0.640 (-1.24)
STKi,t 14.501 (1.99)* 11.586 (1.68)




VPROFi,t 8.614 (3.37)*** 4.972 (2.10)*
SIZEi,t -4.252 (-0.95) -9.230 (-1.93)* -15.896 (-3.24)*** -15.925 (-3.31)***
YGAPt -2.233 (-3.31)*** -2.001 (-3.29)***
MERGERi,t -6.662 (-0.91) -5.123 (-0.92) -3.799 (-0.43) 6.127 (0.45)





NOTES: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively, 
in a two-tailed t-test.
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.896 0.983 0.469 0.209
0.023 0.020 0.046 0.061
0.513 0.695 0.557 0.529
Table 4.1 Additional Hypotheses - Profitability, Stock Market Growth Rate
















BUFi,t-1 0.359 (2.68)** 0.377 (2.75)** 0.374 (2.59)** 0.365 (2.67)**
NPL1i,t -8.725 (-1.43) -8.440 (-2.00)* -8.295 (-2.14)** -3.778 (-0.70)
PROVi,t -1.010 (-2.55)** -1.103 (-3.34)*** -1.111 (-2.88)** -0.983 (-3.49)***
STKi,t 8.364 (1.89)* 15.681 (2.88)** 14.824 (2.99)*** 17.850 (4.18)***
ROEi,t -0.119 (-0.05)
TIER1i,t -0.524 (-0.44)
MKTDi,t 0.542 (1.04) -4.495 (-1.18)
MKTD*SIZEi,t 0.354 (1.33)
SIZEi,t -15.700 (-2.49)** -24.077 (-2.41)** -20.241 (-5.86)*** -36.963 (-2.75)**
YGAPt -1.650 (-2.72)** -1.917 (-3.07)*** -1.817 (-2.81)** -1.435 (-2.18)**
MERGERi,t -3.249 (-0.25) 5.693 (0.44) 5.743 (0.56) 1.635 (0.15)






p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
Model (c) Model (d) Model (e.1) Model (e.2)
0.507 0.862 0.798 0.942
0.497
0.040 0.021 0.044 0.032
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively, 
in a two-tailed t-test.
Table 4.2 Additional Hypotheses - Cost of Capital, Weight of Tier 1 Capital in Total Capital, 
Weight of Market Liabilities in Total Liabilities













An Assessment of Competition in the Portuguese 
Banking System in the 1991-2004 Period* 
 




The purpose of the present paper is to assess the competitive behaviour of Portuguese 
banking groups during the period ranging from 1991 to 2004, using the non-structural test 
developed by Panzar and Rosse. The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system 
has experienced weak competition between 1991 and 1996, underwent a period of 
restructuring until 2000, and from then until 2004 behaved consistently with perfect 
competition. Both private and, more markedly, domestic banks, seem to have competed 
more aggressively on occasions, and no relationship between competitive behaviour and 
bank size was identified. 
 
JEL classification: G21; L13; C23 
Keywords: Banking; Competition; Panzar and Rosse. 
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Over the last two decades the Portuguese financial system went through major changes 
in the competitive environment in which financial intermediaries operate. The first 
liberalisation steps were taken in the mid 1980’s with the opening of domestic markets to 
private initiative, against the background of an almost fully nationalised banking system. 
Until the early 1990’s, banks remained tightly regulated in many dimensions of their 
activity. For instance, both prices and quantities in deposit and loan markets were 
administratively set or severely constrained, while great discretion remained in authorities’ 
hands in what concerns banks’ entry (both domestic and foreign) and branching decisions.
24
 
In this setting, the lack of competitive forces in the 1980’s resulted directly from regulatory 
interference instead of stemming from market players’ conduct. In fact, only in the early 
1990’s banks started to carry out their business in a full market environment, i.e. interest rate 
setting was free in all operations, while credit ceilings, a system of credit quotas defined at 
the bank level that was in effect during the 1980’s, were abolished. In this way, we defined a 
priori the post-1990 period as the focus of our analysis of competitive conditions prevailing 
in the Portuguese banking market. This involved the identification of time series patterns in 
competition and the direct test of regime shift associated to participation in the euro area.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of concentration in the Portuguese banking industry 
according to the 3 and 5-bank concentration indices (C3 and C5, respectively, on the left 
scale) and to the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI, on the right scale), all derived from 
banks’ total assets.
25
  The three presented indicators show that concentration has increased 
over time as the deregulation period was followed by a consolidation trend across the 
market. From Figure 1, it is observable that over the period comprised between 1991 and 
2004 there were two main consolidation waves. Until 1996, as the privatization program 
progressed, concentration increased almost linearly. Afterwards it remained relatively stable 
even though deep changes in the shareholding structure and control in some of the largest 
banks were observed in 2000. 
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 See Ribeiro (2007) for a brief overview of the liberalisation process. 
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 For the k-largest banks of a market with n banks, 𝐶𝑘 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  and 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖 is the market 
share of bank i. Also note that the unit of observation is the economic banking group, rather than the banking 




Another relevant development to the national banking sector during the period under 
scrutiny was the event of privatizations and the increase in the weight of foreign banks, as 
the market was liberalized. In fact, if there were ten public banking groups operating in 
1991, by 1996 there was only one — Caixa Geral de Depósitos. Consequently, the market 
share of public banks in total assets has decreased from close to 60% in 1991 to around 20% 
since 1996. On the other hand, the number of foreign banks has increased from 1991 to 2004 
and so has their market share, which was around 5% in 1991 and slightly over 20% in 2004. 
The recorded increase in the market share of foreign banks was greater than that observed in 
the number of active foreign banks. This reflects a major acquisition carried on by a foreign 
bank during the above mentioned consolidation wave in 2000. In fact, similarly to most 
other European markets, de novo organic growth by foreign players in the Portuguese market 
was not particularly successful in the retail business.  
According to the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain 1951), an 
increase in concentration should be linked to a decrease in competition. However, this result 
contradicts common wisdom and anecdotal evidence regarding the behaviour of the 
Portuguese banking sector during the period under analysis. This fact, which could be 
explained both by Baumol’s contestability theory (Baumol 1982) and by the efficiency 
hypothesis posted by Demestz (1974), motivates the use of the non-structural test described 
below. 
The approach taken to assess the degree of competition consists on specifying tests 
based on empirical reduced form revenue equations, as stated originally in Panzar and Rosse 
(1987). Revenues are explained by a vector of input prices and the sum of the corresponding 
elasticities is a statistic, the so-called H- statistic, with useful properties in the inference of 
competitive behaviour. However, the use of this statistic is not immune to criticism based on 
the assumptions underlying its use as a measure of competition in banking markets. Hence, 
the Panzar-Rosse methodology is a non-structural approach, as opposed to estimable 
specifications rooted on static oligopoly models, which establish testable relationships 
between market structure, direct measures of strategic behaviour and competition. Further, 
this methodology carries the crucial hypothesis that banks are essentially producers of a 
single product in the credit market, while all funding sources, including deposits, are 
considered inputs in banks’ production function. Another controversial issue across most 




either interest income or total income used in levels or scaled by total assets. These issues as 
well as the possible ways of overcoming them in the empirical specification are discussed in 
detail in this paper. Particular attention is dedicated to the definition of the interest revenue 
variable in order to restrict the analysis to the domestic loan market, the most liable to 
exhibit market power in the investment side of banks’ balance sheet. Similarly, the definition 
of the cost of funding variable takes due care of the different role of each bank as a provider 
of immediacy or payment services, in order to control for systematic differences in the 
presence of banks in those segments of funding markets where market power is more prone 
to emerge. Average funding cost is also adjusted to account for the presence of a bank in the 
interbank market both as a creditor and debtor. 
Despite the shortcomings, the simplicity of this methodology explains its popularity in 
the study of competition in banking markets. For instance, it does not require price and 
quantity data on the services provided by banks, an issue that can often be problematic in the 
estimation of empirical structural equations of banks’ behaviour, either because they are not 
available to researchers or due to the fluidity of these services in what concerns establishing 
a measure of their quantity. Another appealing property of this methodology is the fact that it 
allows for the inference of the interaction between input price shocks to the cost function and 
the revenue function, without requiring the estimation of output demand or cost functions. In 
addition, there is no need to worry about the appropriate relevant market in a geographic 
sense, as the input price to revenue relationship captures possible local market product 
differentiation on average, in the aggregate. 
In the next section, the relationship between some common competition models and the 
results of the Panzar and Rosse (P-R) approach are derived. Section 3 presents a brief 
summary of previous empirical findings on the subject, whereas Section 4 presents the data 
and empirical methodology employed and results are shown in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The Panzar-Rosse approach 
2.1 Competitive long-run equilibrium 
To start with, let us establish the main positive result derived in Panzar-Rosse (1987), 




From duality theory and under some regularity conditions, for some arbitrary production 
function 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑀) where 𝑥𝑖 are 𝑀 inputs, there is a function 𝐶(𝑦, 𝑤), the cost 
function, which results from the minimisation of the total production cost 𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  for 
each given output level 𝑦. 
In long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium, price should equal marginal cost and free 
entry and exit conditions determine zero economic profit. For our purposes it translates into 
the two following expressions: 
(1) 𝑝0
𝐶 − 𝐶𝑦(𝑦0




𝐶 , 𝑤) = 0 
where the superscript 𝐶 stands for perfectly competitive equilibrium price and output 
levels. 
Comparative statics in the neighbourhood of the competitive equilibrium can be 
undertaken taking the total differential of (1) and (2) and applying Cramer’s Rule to the 








By Shephard’s Lemma, the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to each 









Taking 𝑅𝐶 as the total receipt 𝑝𝐶𝑦𝐶 in the competitive equilibrium and using equality 













Taking (4), multiplying by factor prices, aggregating and dividing by total receipt, the 
resulting figure is the so-called H-statistic, i.e. the sum of factor price elasticities of total 



























Using the definitions of the cost and marginal cost functions and its equilibrium levels 





















It is straightforward from (2) to see that the first term vanishes and the second term is 
equal to 1. 
The mechanics of what’s in place in this problem can be explained as follows. 
Multiplying all factor prices by the same arbitrary proportion ℎ, as cost functions are 
homogeneous of degree 1 in factor prices, we know that 𝐶(𝑦0
𝐶 , ℎ𝑤) = ℎ𝐶(𝑦0
𝐶 , 𝑤) and 
𝐶𝑦(𝑦0
𝐶 , ℎ𝑤) = ℎ𝐶𝑦(𝑦0





𝐶 are solutions of the problem, with 𝑤1 = ℎ𝑤0. Similarly, from homogeneity of 
degree 1 of the cost function, the vector {𝑝1
𝐶 , 𝑦1
𝐶} that solves condition (1), satisfies also 




















𝐶𝑖 = 1. 
In looser terms, it means that each bank is facing a perfectly elastic demand schedule 
which is tangent to the average cost curve at its minimum. Given the homogeneity of degree 
one in factor prices of both the marginal and average cost functions they shift in the same 
proportion as a simultaneous shock to all factor prices. The same happens to prices, while 
each firm’s market equilibrium quantity remains unaffected. In this way, shifts in factor 
prices transmit fully to total revenue. This is a powerful result allowing for the 
implementation of a direct test of market players’ behaviour consistent with price taking 
behaviour and in which no bank is earning abnormal profits. 
2.2 Monopolistic behaviour in markets for imperfect substitutes 
Models of monopolistic behaviour are the most plausible to consider a priori in banking 
as, even if we consider banks as producers of a single product very homogeneous in its 
intrinsic characteristics, banks differentiate among each other by means of brand advertising 
and/or branch location. The resulting framework is one in which banks differentiate in 




of studying the H-statistic’s properties we will consider both the case of a market with a pre-
fixed number of banks, which is conceptually similar to perfect monopoly behaviour in each 
bank’s captive demand, and the case of free entry and exit a la Chamberlin. In the monopoly 
case, market players can sustain supra-normal profits, because they do not face the threat of 
entry, at least in the short-run. In the latter case, market conditions attract to or drive banks 
away from the market, so that in the long-run equilibrium economic rents cannot be 
extracted. 
2.2.1 Monopolistic behaviour in markets for imperfect 
substitutes 
For simplicity, we consider a market equally shared by a fixed number of banks, in such 
a way that we can concentrate on some arbitrary representative bank. When choosing its 
output level, the representative bank ignores the effect that changes of competitors’ output 
have on the industry prevailing price in such a way that each bank can be considered a 
monopolist in its particular product variety, local market or any other characteristic mapping 
each bank to a different brand from the consumer perspective. In addition, we consider that a 






𝑝𝑦 = 𝜕𝑝𝑖 𝜕𝑦𝑖 < 0⁄  
𝑝𝑛 = 𝜕𝑝𝑖 𝜕𝑛 < 0  ⁄
𝜕𝛾 𝜕𝑛 ≥ 0              ⁄
 
 
Where the first condition consists on assuming a standard negatively sloped demand 
curve, the second condition is a way of stating analytically that the market each bank faces 
shrinks with the number of competitors and the last condition, where 𝛾 stands for the 
symmetric of demand elasticity, implies that each bank’s perceived demand “flattens” with 
the number of banks. In this class of models, perceived demand elasticity can be mapped 
into the Lerner index, i.e. the relative price to marginal cost spread, which is a measure of 
market power. 
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In such a setting, the representative bank chooses the output level 𝑦𝑀 which solves 
implicitly the first order condition 
(8) 𝑅𝑦(𝑦
𝑀, 𝑛) = 𝐶𝑦(𝑦
𝑀, 𝑤) 










Differentiating the revenue function in the neighbourhood of equilibrium output with 











































This expression is clearly non-positive as 𝜕2𝜋 𝜕𝑦2⁄  is negative by the second order 
condition of profit maximisation and 𝛾(. ) Is higher than one in equilibrium for a profit 
maximising monopolist. Hence, a negative (or null) value of the H-statistic is consistent with 
a monopoly (n=1), a perfect cartel that replicates monopoly market outcomes and markets 
with a predetermined number of banks behaving monopolistically. Another interesting result 
is that H is strictly decreasing with respect to the symmetric of the perceived demand 
elasticity, i.e. higher (less negative) values of H can be interpreted as higher effective market 
power exercised by the monopolist. 
2.2.2 Long-run (Chamberlinean) monopolistic competition equilibrium 
Considering the number of banks as endogenous and no longer predetermined as in the 
previous section, the long-run equilibrium is attained when no incentives prevail to bank 




demand schedule up to the point where each bank is operating at its economic profit break-
even point.
27
 Analytically it implies that in addition to the representative bank’s first order 
condition stating that marginal revenues equate marginal costs as in (8), a zero-profit 
condition has to be imposed, such as: 
(12) 𝑅(𝑦∗, 𝑛∗) = 𝐶(𝑦∗, 𝑤) 
where 𝑛∗ is the long-run equilibrium number of symmetric banks. 
Totally differentiating both conditions with respect to factor prices and the number of 
banks, solving for 𝜕𝑦𝑛 𝜕𝑤𝑖⁄ , multiplying by factor prices and aggregating over all factors 
yields: 
(13) 








Rewriting the numerator in terms of the inverse demand function it becomes: 
(14) 

















∗ 𝑝∗ + 𝑝𝑛
∗ 𝑦∗ = 𝑝𝑛
∗ (1 − 𝛾)𝑦∗, expression (14) 
simplifies to: 
(15) 

























The second term is clearly positive, given the assumptions in (7). Further, all else 
constant, the H-statistic is increasing in the perceived demand elasticity and converges to 1 
as it approaches infinity, replicating the perfect competition outcome derived above. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that this concept of equilibrium is built up on 
assumptions of individual firm profit maximisation, taking all other firms’ actions as 
constant. This assumption implies no strategic interaction of market players, arguably a too 
naïve description of market players’ behaviour in an oligopoly (for e.g., see Kreps (1990) for 
a particularly sanguine sceptical discussion of this model). 
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 This concept of long-run equilibrium is usually labelled “Chamberlinian equilibrium” and borrows 




Anyway, the non-acceptance of both the null hypothesis of 𝐻 ≤ 0 and 𝐻 = 1 has been 
interpreted in previous empirical applications as resulting from a market environment which 
is not consistent with either long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium or perfect tacit 
collusive behaviour. Instead, it must contain elements that are akin to both monopoly and 
perfect competition, representing some intermediate position, as it is the case in the 
monopolistic competition equilibrium (see, e.g., Henderson et al. (1980), page 193). 
3. Previous empirical findings 
Most studies applying the Panzar and Rosse methodology reject both the hypothesis of 
monopoly (or perfect cartel) behaviour and that of perfect competition. In a cross-country 
analysis for the EU-15 for the period between 1997 and 2003, Casu and Girardone (2006) 
find a value for the H-statistic between zero and one, thus rejecting both monopoly and 
perfect competition, at EU-15 level, as well as for most countries individually, including 
Portugal.
28
 Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004) also reject both monopoly and 
perfect competition, for a period ranging from 1998 to 2002. However, in this study, the 
H-statistic is only estimated for the EU-15 as a whole and not for Portugal individually. 
Bikker et al. (2006) present a cross-country study where competitive conditions are 
estimated for 101 countries between 1986 and 2005. Since this paper intends to make a 
methodological point, several different specifications are estimated, and the results obtained 
for Portugal range from monopoly, in their preferred specifications, to perfect competition in 
the models they consider misspecified.
29
 In general, available results for Portugal are similar 
to those found for other countries. For a more complete summary of results obtained in 
applications of the Panzar and Rosse methodology, refer to Table 1 in Casu and Girardone 
(2006) and to Table 1 in Bikker et al. (2006). 
4. Data and empirical methodology 
The dataset used in this study was obtained from banks’ financial statements reported to 
Banco de Portugal. The database comprises an unbalanced panel of yearly data for all active 
banks operating in Portugal from 1991 to 2004. Since detailed consolidated accounting data 
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is available only for the most recent period, data on individual basis was used instead. 
However, since interest lies in comparing the behaviour of different economic units rather 
than legal entities, data for banks belonging to the same economic group were aggregated 
into one decision making unit. 
All banks operating in Portugal are required to report financial statements to Banco de 
Portugal. However, there is a large number of small banks that mostly operate in investment 
banking and are thus likely to behave differently from most commercial or universal banks. 
Hence, in order to obtain a sample of reasonably homogenous banks, observations for 
institutions with less than 15 branches or 15 employees were eliminated. Banks that do not 
take any deposits from customers were also eliminated, and it was checked that positive 
values for total assets and equity were reported for all observations in the sample. The first 
two years of activity of new banks were also eliminated, as it seems reasonable to assume 
that during early stages banks may behave differently than once their activity is stabilized. 
25 banking groups and a total of 197 observations survived this process. For each year, the 
final sample includes no less than 92% of loans granted to customers, 94% of customer 
deposits held and 92% of total assets of the Portuguese banking system. All money variables 
were deflated using the GDP deflator. 
The definition of banks’ outputs and inputs is by no means simple. On the one hand, the 
“production approach” to bank modelling regards banks as firms producing services which 
are related to loans and deposit accounts, thus measuring output by the number of deposit 
accounts serviced and the number of loans originated and input by labour and physical 
capital. On the other hand, according to the “intermediation approach” (Sealey and Lindley 
(1977)), banks’ main activity is granting loans and investing in securities and other assets 
using funds obtained through deposits, purchased funds and equity.
30
 Hence, while both 
approaches agree in classifying labour and physical capital as inputs, they present a 
conflicting view as to whether deposits should be classified as an output or as an input. Since 
economic theory does not give clear guidance as to which modelling approach best describes 
the behaviour of the banking firm, it is somewhat reassuring to note that estimated cost 
functions appear relatively insensitive to which approach is followed (Humphrey (1990)). 
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence suggesting that deposits overall behave 
                                                          
30




primarily as inputs (examples are Gilligan and Smirlock (1984), Hughes and Mester (1993), 
Shaffer (1994) and Hughes, Mester and Moon (2000)). The Panzar and Rosse methodology 
used in this study follows the intermediation approach. Hence banks are modelled as firms 
that use labour, physical capital and funds in order to produce loans. 
There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether the dependent variable 
used to estimate empirical P-R equations should consider total or only interest revenue. On 
the one hand, the fact that the P-R method considers loans as banks’ main output, suggests 
interest revenue should be used. On the other hand, the increase in the relative importance of 
commissions and fees in banks’ total revenue should not be neglected. Hence, in the baseline 
specification, we choose to use interest revenue as the dependent variable and include the 
ratio of other income to interest income as a regressor, thus accounting for changes in 
income structure. Nonetheless, in order to check for the sensitivity of results, models where 




A third matter of discussion is whether banks’ size should be controlled for. Since it 
seems overly simplistic to assume banks’ size is uncorrelated with input prices, it is likely 
that the exclusion of a scaling variable could bias the estimates for the elasticities of factor 
prices. On the other hand, Bikker et al. (2006) point out that the use of a scaling variable 
(either as a regressor or by defining the dependent variable as the ratio of revenue to total 
assets rather than the absolute value of revenue) effectively turns the revenue equation into a 
price equation, and the sum of the elasticities of the output price with respect to input prices 
is positive by definition, and independent of the industry’s degree of competition. Hence, 
including a scaling factor in the estimated equation could introduce a positive bias the 
estimate of H. The possible presence of “errors-in-variables” due to the approximation of 
input prices should, however, act in the opposite direction, as it should bias the estimated 
coefficients downwards, whether a scaling factor is used or not. 
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 The choice to include the ratio of other revenue to interest revenue is particularly interesting since 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅 = ln(𝐼𝑅 + 𝑂𝑅) ≈ 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑅 + (𝑂𝑅/𝐼𝑅), as put forward in Bikker et al. (2006). Note, however, that 𝑂𝑅/𝐼𝑅 
may not be exogenous in the regression, and so we do not test whether its coefficient equals minus one (in 
which case the regression would be equivalent to one where the dependent variable is total income) or zero (in 
which case the regression would in turn be equivalent to one where the dependent variable is interest income 
and other income is not controlled for). Nonetheless, estimation results where 𝑂𝑅/𝐼𝑅 is not considered and the 
dependent variable is either total income (see Table 3) or interest income (not shown but available upon 




The baseline specification for the empirical reduced form revenue equation stemming 
from log-linear marginal revenue and cost functions is presented below
32
: 
(16) 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)𝑖𝑡 = ℎ1𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ℎ2𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝐾𝑖𝑡 + ℎ3𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛿 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
where Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic is obtained by ∑ ℎ𝑘
3
𝑘=1 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control 
variables, 𝛿 is a constant term, 𝜂𝑖 is an unobservable variable that captures idiosyncratic 
features of each institution that are constant over time and 𝑖𝑡 is a random shock. 
The dependent variable used in the baseline specification is the natural logarithm of 
interest revenue obtained from loans granted to domestic clients. The option to focus the 
analysis only on the portion of interest revenue earned on loans rather than including all 
interest income is explained by the fact that banks are known to have little market power on 
the remaining interest earning business, such as interbank and securities activities. As such, 
the analytical interest lies on testing how competitive banks are in customer lending. Hence, 
a broader specification of the dependent variable would very likely overestimate the 
competitive conditions in the banking system. This is a novelty feature of this study worth 
emphasising as, to our knowledge, all previous studies apply this methodology to all interest 
revenues. 
The average price of labour — 𝑤𝐿 — is proxied by the ratio of labour costs to the 
number of employees, whereas the ratio of (tangible and intangible) capital expenditure to 
(tangible and intangible) fixed assets — 𝑤𝐾 — proxies the cost of capital and the ratio of 
interest paid to interest bearing debt — 𝑤𝐹 — measures banks’ average funding cost. 
As to what concerns the control variables, vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the ratio of demand 
deposits to total deposits and that of market liabilities to total liabilities in order to account 
for banks’ funding mix, whereas the ratio of short-term loans to total loans and of interbank 
assets to customer loans, on the other hand, intend to capture the asset structure. The 
increasing importance of banks’ off-balance-sheet activity is controlled for by the inclusion 
of the ratio of off-balance-sheet activity to total assets. The ratio of assets to branches intends 
to capture different branching strategies, measuring systematic differences in banks’ branch 
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 The use of the loglinear form is widespread among studies applying the P-R methodology, as it typically 
improves the regression’s goodness of fit and may reduce simultaneity bias (De Bandt and Davies 2000). 
Furthermore, Molyneux et al. (1996) found that a loglinear revenue equation yielded similar results to more 




density. The share of customer loans that have defaulted during each year is a credit risk 
measure that attempts to capture the flow rather than the stock of non-performing loans, thus 
decreasing the ex-post character of this variable. In turn, the ratio of equity to assets should 
proxy banks’ risk aversion once credit risk is controlled for. The ratio of other revenue 
(composed of net commission and fee income) to interest revenue, as discussed above, 
intends to capture the increasing role of non-interest revenue in banks’ income. The 
inclusion of asset quartile dummies in the equation is a compromise solution that intends to 
address the misspecification described in Bikker et al. (2006), while at the same time 
controlling at least partially for the correlation between banks’ size and input prices.
33
 
Finally, dummy variables identifying when a merger has occurred, or if a bank is foreign or 
public are also included.
34
 Descriptive statistics of the included variables are presented in 
Table 1. 
Equation (16) was first estimated for the whole sample, including domestic and foreign 
as well as private and state owned banks for the period ranging from 1991 to 2004. However, 
as discussed in Section 1, this time period is by no means homogenous, since during the 
early to mid-90’s the Portuguese banking system underwent a phase of privatizations, 
consolidation and liberalization, while preparing for euro area participation. Hence, we 
perform a sequential test for differences in the H-statistic through time by first estimating an 
equation using data for the first four years in the sample and checking whether the estimate 
for the fourth year is statistically different from that obtained for the initial period 
comprising the first three years. If so, a new period starting on the fourth year would be 
created; if not, 1994 would be pooled with 1991-1993. This process was repeated until 2004, 
restricting each period to comprise at least three years of data.
35
 
In order to test for differences in the competitive behaviour of different types of banks, 
equations considering only domestic banks and only private banks were estimated. Even 
though it would be more informative to allow the estimate of the degree of competition to 
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 In the sample used, the simple correlation coefficient between the logarithm of assets and the price of 
labour, capital and funds is 0.36, -0.07 and -0.23 respectively. 
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 Only domestic public banks are classified as public, since public banks operating abroad are likely to 
exhibit a different behaviour than that of local public banks. 
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 One reason to maintain this restriction is connected to the small size of the available sample. 
Furthermore, De Bandt e Davies (2000) advocate the importance of the time series component as they find 




vary across types of banks, this option is not feasible due to the small number of public and 
foreign banks in the sample. Hence, the statistical significance of the difference in 
competitive behaviour observed across types of banks is not tested. 
As several authors have pointed out (examples are Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Hempel 
(2002)), small banks may have more market power in local markets, whereas larger banks 
are generally believed to face greater competition. Note that  this  argument  may  not  apply  
directly  to  Portugal,  considering  the relatively small size of the national market and the 
fact that most regions tend to be served by at least one large bank. Nevertheless, the only 
truly effective way of addressing the misspecification pointed out in Bikker et al. (2006) 
while avoiding the introduction of other sources of bias is to analyse the competitive 
behaviour of similarly sized banks, thus avoiding the need to use a scaling variable. Hence, 
the same estimation procedure is applied to small and large banks separately, where small 
and large is defined according to whether a bank’s total assets are above or below average 
total assets for each year.  We divide the sample in only two groups in order to minimize the 
loss of degrees of freedom, and the average is chosen over the median as, due to the high 
concentration in the Portuguese banking market, the group of the 50% largest institutions is 
very heterogeneous in terms of size. Once again, the small sample size introduces limitations 
in that it renders unfeasible the estimation of different measures of competition through time 
when the sample is divided between small and large banks. 
The interpretation of the H-statistic depends on whether or not banks are in a state of 
long run equilibrium. In fact, while the result that the sum of factor price elasticities of a 
monopolist’s reduced form revenue function must be non-positive holds even in the short 
run, results for models of perfect and monopolistic competition depend on the assumption 
that the firms are observed in long-run equilibrium (see Panzar and Rosse (1987)). As is 
common practice in studies applying the Panzar and Rosse methodology, we use the fact that 
in equilibrium risk-adjusted rates of return should be equalised across banks.
36
 Thus, banks’ 
return on assets (ROA) should be uncorrelated with input prices when the market is in 
equilibrium. A direct test of equilibrium consists in estimating the equation for revenue with 
ROA as the dependent variable and performing a test to the null hypothesis 𝐻 = 0 
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(equilibrium) against 𝐻 < 0 (disequilibrium), where H is the sum of factor price elasticities 
with respect to the profitability measure. 
To test for the robustness of the results, some alternative specifications were estimated,  
including  the  use  of  total  rather  than  interest  income  as  the dependent variable and 
using alternative scaling variables, such as the natural logarithm of total assets, scaling 
income by total assets and not controlling for size differences at all. 
In order to account for the existence of non-measurable bank specific factors that are 
invariant through time, the fixed-effects estimator was used, thus allowing for possible 
correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory variables. 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents fixed-effects estimation results for equation (16), as well as for the 
auxiliary regression used to perform the long run equilibrium test. The estimates for 
elasticities of interest income with respect to each of the three inputs considered prove to be 
positive. The estimate for the H-statistic, laying at 0.691, changes only marginally when 
statistically non-significant variables are eliminated from the regression.
37
 The test for 
monopoly performed is a one sided test for the null hypothesis 𝐻 ≤ 0 versus the alternative 
𝐻 > 0. The former is clearly rejected in favour of the latter, thus providing compelling 
evidence against the hypothesis that the Portuguese banking system has operated as a 
monopoly or a perfect cartel on average during the period under scrutiny.
38
 If, on the other 
hand, banks were under perfect competition, the H-statistic should equal one. A two sided 
test for this hypothesis is thus performed and, as shown in Table 2, the corresponding 
p-value is close to 10%, so that it is not clear whether perfect competition should be rejected 
or not. Another relevant result reported in Table 2 is that the application of the long-term 
equilibrium test described in the previous section does not allow for the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, therefore providing no evidence to reject the assumption that the Portuguese 
banking industry was in long-run equilibrium during the relevant period  Hence, one may 
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Rosse methodology have used a two sided test, thus specifying the alternative hypothesis as 𝐻 ≠ 0, this is 




conclude that, on average, in the period ranging from 1991 to 2004, the behaviour of 
Portuguese banks cannot be assessed as consistent with alternative forms of monopoly-like 
conduct (such as perfect cartel or monopolistic competition in a market without the threat of 
entry), and it is not clear whether it is consistent with perfectly competitive behaviour, or 
whether it is best described as stemming from a long-run monopolistic competition model 
with weak market power. 
The control variables regarding the funding mix have not shown to be significant, 
whereas the negative sign on the variable which measures the maturity structure of granted 
loans suggests that banks for which the weight of short term loans is more important tend to 
earn less revenue, which is consistent with the fact that credit risk adjusted spreads tend to be 
lower on short than on long term loans. The same reasoning, i.e. differences in spreads, may 
be used for the interpretation of the result that banks with a higher ratio of interbank assets to 
customer loans tend to earn lower interest revenue from customer loans, whereas it seems 
natural that banks which are more active in the interbank and securities market relatively to 
the customer loan market, for a given value of total assets, earn less revenue from the latter 
business. Banks with more off balance sheet activity seem to earn higher interest revenues, 
which is possibly driven by the fact that banks with more off balance sheet activity tend to 
have a riskier profile.  
Banks with relatively less, and possibly larger branches tend to earn higher interest 
income, whereas the measures of credit risk and of risk aversion have the expected signs, 
even if the former is not statistically significant. As expected, the coefficient on the variable 
which controls for the ratio of other revenue to total revenue yields a negative sign. As 
expected, the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables identifying the quartile of the 
asset distribution to which each bank belongs indicate that, all else constant, smaller banks 
tend to earn less revenue. As to what concerns the remaining control variables, mergers do 
not seem to have a significant impact on interest revenue earned whereas, ceteris paribus, 
foreign banks seem to earn more interest revenue, while the opposite result is found for 
public banks.  
Table 3 shows a series of robustness tests in the form of alternative specifications to 
Model [1] which illustrate the impact in results of different choices regarding the dependent 
variable and the scaling variables used. As to what concerns different definitions of the 




income is chosen as the dependent variable are presented. From comparison of the first two 
and of the last two lines in Table 3, one finds that considering total rather than interest 
revenue has virtually no impact, either in the point estimate for H-statistic or in the tests 
conducted upon it. 
Another relevant robustness test involves checking the sensitivity of results to different 
scaling variables. From the results presented in Table 3 one finds that, as expected, 
specifying the dependent variable as the ratio of revenues to assets yields virtually the same 
results as specifications where the natural logarithm of assets is included as a regressor.
39
 If, 
instead, one controls for the size difference of banks through the use of asset quartile 
dummies, the estimate for the H-statistic decreases slightly when interest income is used as 
the dependent variable. A more relevant change is the fact that, as reported in Bikker (2006), 
standard deviations are compressed in “price equations”, which might lead to reject perfect 
competition too often, even if a point estimate that is closer to one is obtained. As shown in 
the last column of Table 3 above, specifications where no scaling variable is used yield a 
somewhat lower estimate for the H-statistic, whereas results for hypothesis tests remain 
unchanged relatively to specifications where total assets are considered. 
Hence, considering a series of alternative specifications, it remains quite clear that, from 
1991 to 2004, the Portuguese banking sector has not operated under monopoly. However 
there is now greater evidence towards the rejection of perfectly competitive behaviour as 
well, and so the hypothesis of an intermediate situation, such as that of monopolistic 
competition, seems more appropriate. 
As briefly discussed in the first section of this study, the Portuguese banking system 
underwent significant changes during the sample period. Hence in order to investigate 
whether the process of liberalization and consolidation has had an impact in competitive 
conditions, the estimated H-statistic is allowed to vary over time without any particular 
functional form being imposed upon it, through the method described in the previous 
section. Aggregation tests to find homogenous periods were conducted on the specification 
presented in Model [1]. As a result, three periods were obtained: a first period of 
consolidation and adjustment to less restrictive regulations — 1991 to 1996; a second period 
of post-consolidation adjustment, which includes the beginning of euro area participation — 
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1997 to 2000; and a final period of relative maturity, ending in 2004. Table 4 presents results 
for fixed-effects estimates of the H-statistic for the three periods, as well as for the whole 
sample, using as scaling variables the natural logarithm of total assets (line 1) and dummy 
variables for asset quartiles (line 2) as well as using no scaling variable (line 3). 
During the first period, perfect competition is rejected in all specifications and 
monopoly is rejected only when the natural logarithm of total assets is used as a scaling 
variable. For the other specifications, which according to Bikker et al. (2006) should be more 
reliable, the monopoly hypothesis is not rejected and the estimate of the H-statistic is either 
negative or close to zero. Furthermore, during this first period of intense consolidation and 
privatization, there is no evidence to reject the hypothesis that the Portuguese banking 
system was operating in equilibrium. Hence, one concludes that the degree of competition 
was relatively low during this period. As to what concerns the next period, even if 
conclusions for the hypothesis tests on the H-statistic are the same, there is evidence that the 
system was not operating under long-run equilibrium. Hence, estimated coefficients 
constitute no evidence of collusive behaviour, since while the rejection of monopoly in the 
first specification remains valid in this context, non-rejection of 𝐻 ≤ 0 under disequilibrium 
no longer implies that the industry has behaved jointly as a monopoly. In the most recent 
period, while there is strong evidence to reject perfect monopoly (as well as perfect cartel or 
short run monopolistic behaviour without threat of entry) in all specifications, perfect 
competition is no longer rejected under any of the three specifications. Furthermore, 
differences in the estimate of the H-statistic between the intermediate and the most recent 
period are, both in the magnitude and in the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients, more striking than those found between the first and the second period. 
Since foreign banks are likely to behave differently from domestic banks, a replication 
of the above results while restricting the sample to domestic banks is presented in Table 5. 
An increase in the estimated value of the H-statistic across most periods and specifications is 
observed.
40
 In fact, even if conclusions regarding the first period remain unchanged, perfect 
competition is only rejected for domestic banks between 1997 and 2000 when the natural 
logarithm of total assets is included in the regression, which suggests domestic banks have 
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behaved more competitively than the banking system as a whole during this period. Obtained 
results for the period between 2001 and 2004 when the natural logarithm of total assets is not 
considered explicitly are consistent with the hypothesis that domestic banks might have 
behaved too competitively in this period, which may be rationalized under a more complex, 
dynamic model, where banks aggressively fight for increased market share in order to 
capitalize on it with high profits in the future.
41
 Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
domestic banks have not operated under long run equilibrium in the eve of the EMU. 
Restricting the estimate for the degree of competition exerted by domestic banks to be 
constant from 1991 to 2004, if one once again concentrates on specifications where the 
natural logarithm of total assets is not explicitly considered, higher values for the H-statistic 
are obtained when the sample is restricted to domestic banks, and there is no evidence to 
reject perfect competition. As can be seen by comparison of tables 4 and 5, when the 
logarithm of assets is included as a scaling variable, results for the relevant hypothesis tests 
do not change even though the point estimate for H decreases. 
Table 6 shows the result of similar estimations ran on a sample which includes only 
private banks. Since the number of public banks in the sample is relatively small, it is not 
surprising to find that results are quite close to those obtained for all banks. Nevertheless, the 
degree of competition as inferred by the H-statistic is slightly higher for private banks 
between 1991 and 1997 as well as when the full 1991-2004 period is considered, in which 
case there is also less compelling evidence towards the rejection of the perfect competition 
hypothesis when only private banks are considered. 
As to what concerns the comparison of the H-statistic between small and large banks, no 
robust difference was found. In fact, in addition to results not being robust to slight changes 
in banks’ classification, equality of the estimates obtained for each group is not statistically 
rejected. Hence, during the period under analysis, there is no evidence that small banks have 
been able to exert higher market power due to a stronger presence in local markets where 
competition is less aggressive. The fact that this hypothesis, which has been widely stated 
and tested for other countries, does not apply to Portugal, should be linked to the smaller size 
of the national market as compared to those for which the relevant result has been obtained, 
since in larger countries it is common to find banks which have a strong position in the 
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region where they operate, despite having little weight in the national market as a whole. 
This fact mitigates the existence of fully distinct local markets in the Portuguese case. 
6. Conclusions 
The main conclusion to retain from this study is that on average, over the period from 
1991 to 2004, Portuguese banks do not seem to have operated either under perfect 
competition or under perfect monopoly, but rather consistently with long-run monopolistic 
competition. During this period, both private and domestic banks seem to have competed 
more aggressively on average than the banking system as a whole, and perfect competition 
may not be rejected for these two types of banks. 
An investigation of changes in competitive behaviour throughout the period suggests 
that competition was relatively weak between 1991 and 1996, even though results suggest 
domestic and especially private banks exhibited slightly higher competitive behaviour. An 
adjustment period followed between 1997 and 2000, in which behaviour consistent with long 
run equilibrium is rejected both for the banking system as a whole and for the group of 
private banks, whereas for domestic banks the hypothesis of behaviour consistent with 
perfectly competitive long run equilibrium is not rejected. In the more recent period, ranging 
from 2001 to 2004, strong competition was observed, and it is possible that domestic banks 
have competed more aggressively than expected in the framework of a static model with no 
distortions. Hence, the results suggest that the deregulation and liberalization process 
experienced by the Portuguese banking sector, including euro area participation, catalysed an 
increase in competition, particularly in what concerns the credit market. 
One should, nonetheless, bear in mind the limitations of the non-structural approach 
employed, particularly regarding the hypotheses implicitly imposed on the underlying model 
for banks’ behaviour. Therefore, obtained results should be compared with those derived 
using alternative methods in order to draw more general conclusions on the degree of 
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Note: Money variables are in millions of 1991 Euros (unless otherwise stated) and ratios 












Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Interest Revenue 197 307.6 340 2.5 1445.6
Total Revenue 197 348.7 385 2.5 1702.3
Interest Revenue/Assets 197 4.2 2 0.4 10.6
Total Revenue/Assets 197 4.7 2 0.8 10.9
wL (thousands  of euros) 197 21.2 3.9 7.4 31.9
wk 197 13.3 5.6 4 41.9
wF 197 6.9 4.5 1.1 27.6
Demand Deposits/Total Deposits 197 35.6 9.5 18.7 65.2
Market Liabilities/Total Liabilities 197 44.1 14.6 13.4 88.7
Short-term Loans/Total Loans 197 46.7 20.8 9.3 93.8
Interbank Assets/Customer Loans 197 45.2 36.5 0.3 169.7
Off Balance Sheet Activity/Assets 197 190.1 2365.9 3.4 33228.2
Assets/Branches 197 27.3 10.9 4.4 58.7
NPL flow 197 1.5 1.3 0 7.6
Equity/Assets 197 6.9 2.7 1.5 29.8
Other Revenue/Total Revenue 197 14.6 12.8 1 105.6
ROA 197 0.49 0.57 -4.74 2.58





Baseline estimation results 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in italic. (a) The 








ln w L 0.28 0.16 -0.69 1.80
ln w K 0.23 0.08 -0.49 0.82
ln w F 0.18 0.11 3.19 1.91
Demand Deposits/Total Deposits -0.79 0.71 3.84 6.51
Market Liabilities/Total Liabilities -0.63 0.58 -5.73 6.10
Short-term Loans/Total Loans -1.03 0.31 6.62 3.68
Interbank Assets/Customer Loans -0.46 0.10 -3.85 1.20
Off Balance Sheet Activity/Assets 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01
Assets/Branches
(a)
0.02 0.01 0.15 0.07
NPL flow 1.58 2.33 -193.52 82.80
Equity/Assets -8.10 2.62 39.28 14.49
Other Revenue/Total Revenue -1.73 0.42 8.46 6.06
Aqrt(25) -1.35 0.21 -0.67 1.80
Aqrt(50) -1.11 0.19 -0.94 1.52
Aqrt(75) -0.27 0.11 -0.54 0.97
M 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.68
F 0.49 0.17 4.84 2.48
P -0.82 0.16 -3.42 1.84








# Observations 197 197
# Banks 25 25






Alternative dependent and scaling variables 
 
For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-values for the 
test H≤0 (left) and H=1 (right) are presented below. ***, ** and * indicate evidence of 
disequilibrium at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
Table 4 
Competition through time for all banks 
 
For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-values for the 
tests H≤0 (left), H=1 (right) and Ht=Ht+1 (between periods) are presented below.  ***, ** and 





0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06




















0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.04
0.39 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.10

























Competition through time for domestic banks 
 
For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-values for the 
tests H≤0 (left), H=1 (right) and Ht=Ht+1 (between periods) are presented below.  ***, ** and 
* indicate evidence of disequilibrium at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Table 6 
Competition through time for privately owned banks 
 
For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-values for the 
tests H≤0 (left), H=1 (right) and Ht=Ht+1 (between periods) are presented below.  ***, ** and 
* indicate evidence of disequilibrium at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.04
0.27 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.92






















0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.05
0.14 0.09 0.60 0.03 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.30























An assessment of Portuguese banks’ efficiency and 
productivity towards euro area participation* 
Miguel Boucinha, Nuno Ribeiro, Thomas Weyman-Jones 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the production technology of Portuguese banks during the 1992–
2006 period through the estimation of a translog cost frontier. This period is of major interest 
because it covers Portugal’s euro area accession and its impact on the banking system. 
Hence, critical factors impacting the banking system are identified against the background of 
increasing financial integration prior to the financial crisis that started in 2007 and later 
translated into strains in some European sovereign debt markets. Banks are modelled as 
firms which produce loans and other earning assets, choosing the cost minimizing 
combination of labour, capital and interest bearing debt, subject to holding a predetermined 
level of equity. According to the results of this study, technological progress has shifted the 
cost frontier downwards throughout the period under consideration, whereas the distance at 
which banks have operated from the frontier seems to have remained constant. Further, 
increases in production under scale economies have also contributed to the recorded increase 
in productivity. 
 
JEL classification: G21, L13. 
Keywords: Bank performance, Marginal costs, X-efficiency, Total factor productivity 
change. 
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Banks play a central role in the financial system and also in the real economy, as the 
recent financial crisis has vividly illustrated. Their smooth functioning allows for the 
intermediation of funds in the economy and provides for a wide range of financial services. 
In order to ensure this, banks need not only to adequately monitor their risks, but also to 
efficiently allocate their resources. Hence, the measurement of bank performance is a critical 
issue that has deserved considerable attention in the banking literature. 
In this paper, we propose to analyse developments in the performance of the Portuguese 
banking system between 1992 and 2006, a period in which significant changes were 
observed, including the process of liberalization, consolidation and financial innovation.
42
 
These changes had a profound impact on the market’s structure and on banks’ technology 
and, through the analysis of a cost function, we assess how they affected banks’ marginal 
costs and total productivity, which we decompose into the effect of returns to scale, cost 
efficiency change and technological progress.
43
 In this way, we can not only quantify total 
factor productivity growth, but also identify if changes in productivity were driven by 
moving to a different point in the cost function, by moving closer to the cost frontier or by 
shifts in the frontier itself. 
The analysis does not include the period of the financial crisis which emerged in 2007, 
since during this period banks started to experience marked increases in the prices of market 
funding and, more importantly, some quantitative constraints, which became progressively 
stronger until 2010. The presence of quantitative funding constraints is not consistent with 
the model defined below, since the cost function is derived solving a maximization problem 
in which the amount of funding is considered variable in the short-term. Furthermore, as the 
crisis intensified, some banks resorted in large scale to ECB lending to fund their activity. 
These loans are provided at very low cost, but they are supposed to be used only if 
necessary, and not to fund banks’ normal activity. Hence, while some banks made an effort 
to increase funding from other sources at higher cost (mainly through customer deposits) 
others took advantage of the low cost funding from the ECB in a search for yield. Against 
this background, the banks which opted for funding at higher cost clearly did not behave as 
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 See Ribeiro (2007) and Antão et al. (2009) for a brief overview of the liberalization process. 
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profit maximizers in the strict sense of our model which thus proves inadequate to represent 
banks behaviour during this period. Lastly, as the sovereign crisis intensified, banks were 
faced with strong exogenous constraints stemming not only from stricter capital 
requirements, but also from the point of view of deleveraging their balance sheets, namely 
through the definition of a trajectory to lower the loan to deposit ratio in the medium term. 
These constraints implied that, during this period, many of the variables of interest in the 
model do not correspond to standard optimizing behaviour in the context of our model. 
The modelling framework adopted allows for the identification, through the envelope 
theorem, of the estimated shadow return on equity capital prior to the global financial crisis 
and both before and after euro area accession. The importance of this estimated shadow 
return arises from the fact that equity or owner’s capital is a major risk-absorbing capacity of 
the banking system. In other words, changes in the asset valuation of the banking firms 
impact directly on their equity capital, and the ensuing change in banks’ leverage, in 
conjunction with an increased reliance on short term funding, has been identified as an 
extremely important indicator of the risk- absorbing capacity of the European banking 
systems. 
Previous empirical results on the efficiency of Portuguese banks include the work by 
Mendes and Rebelo (1999), (2000), Pinho (2001), Canhoto and Dermine (2003), Lima 
(2008) and Lima and Pinho (2008). The majority of these studies estimated translog cost 
functions using Stochastic frontier Analysis (SFA), while in the one by Canhoto and 
Dermine (2003) a non-parametric frontier was estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and Mendes and Rebelo (2000) employ both methodologies. 
Even though the above mentioned studies use different empirical and theoretical 
approaches to the modelling of banks’ activity and cover different time periods (starting in 
1987 and ending in 2004), all but the one by Mendes and Rebelo (1999) found that the 
productivity of Portuguese banks has increased. However, as expected given the differences 
in the approaches, they do not agree on the levels of X-inefficiency. The identification of 
shifts in best practices and changes in the distance at which banks operate from the efficient 
frontier also varies across studies according to the methodology employed. In fact, some 
studies do not allow for the distinction of the two effects, since the frontier is assumed to be 
constant over time, so that all productivity changes are attributed to changes in cost 




banks tend to perform worse on average whereas Canhoto and Dermine (2003) found that 
banks which were created after 1984 and foreign banks perform better than older banks 
which operated under the previously prevalent tightly regulated market conditions, including 
state-owned banks. Mendes and Rebelo (2000) and Lima (2008) also found that mergers 
contributed to increase banks’ performance. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and 
the data used in order to estimate banks’ cost function and productivity. Section 3 presents 
the empirical results and is divided into 6 subsections, comprising the discussion of the 
estimates for Portuguese banks’ marginal costs, the shadow cost of equity, scale efficiency, 
cost efficiency, technological progress and total factor productivity growth. Section 4 
presents the concluding remarks. 
2. Methodology and data 
The modelling of banks’ production has been the subject of considerable debate in the 
literature, essentially due to the controversy regarding the classification of customer deposits 
as inputs or as outputs. On the one hand, the production approach to bank modelling regards 
banks as firms producing services which are related to loans and deposit accounts, thus 
identifying as outputs the number of deposit accounts serviced and the number of loans 
originated and as inputs labour and physical capital. On the other hand, according to the 
inter- mediation approach (Sealey and Lindley (1977), banks’ main activity is granting loans 
and investing in securities and other assets using funds obtained through deposits, purchased 
funds and equity.
44
  There are sensible theoretical arguments supporting both approaches, 
and there is not a clear preference for either of them in empirical applications.
45
   However, 
as remarked in Hughes et al. (2001) the inclusion of deposits both as inputs and as outputs 
would yield misleading results. In this case, the cost function would include both the level of 
deposits (since deposits are an output) and the price of deposits, whereas the definition of 
costs would include deposit related interest expenses (since deposits are an input). The 
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 See Freixas and Rochet (1998), pp. 77–79, on the production and intermediation approach. 
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 The fact that the production approach identifies as outputs the number of loans originated and deposit 
accounts constitutes an additional complication since this data is often unavailable. Studies which follow the 





argument is that the optimal choice of one input – deposits – would not be influenced by the 
price of this input, since its quantity is held fixed. 
There are two main reasons why holding deposits is an attractive activity for banks. On 
the one hand, as suggested by the production approach, deposits generate commission 
income and are a product which adds value in itself, as the general public does not have 
access to the same investment opportunities as banks. On the other hand, they are a relatively 
low cost and stable source of funding. Either way, a considerable part of banks’ resources is 
dedicated to the origination and management of deposits. However, even though on a 
smaller scale, the acquisition and management of any input carries costs. 
Hence, we follow Hughes and Mester (1993) in reasoning that deposits should be 
modelled as inputs (outputs) if the elasticity of total costs deducted of interest paid on 
deposits to the level of deposits is negative (positive). According to the result of this test 
(shown in Table 1), we choose to model deposits as inputs. This specification has the 
additional advantage of allowing for a more comprehensive definition of banks’ costs, since 
otherwise the definition of costs would totally ignore funding costs, and so the measurement 
of efficiency would be limited to operational costs. Such an analysis could yield misleading 
results as some banks may be willing to bear higher operational costs (with employees and 
equipment) in order to optimize their funding structure, thus attaining lower funding costs. A 
similar argument motivates the inclusion of equity as a fixed input since, as remarked in 
Hughes et al. (2001), otherwise banks which find relatively more funding in equity and less 
in debt would spuriously appear to be more efficient. The fact that equity is treated as a 
quasi-fixed rather than a variable input is justified by regulatory and rating/reputation 
constraints to the choice of the optimal level of equity. Further, the costs associated to 
common equity issues lead banks to raise capital in relatively large tranches. As a 
consequence, current levels of capital need not only suffice to cover risks currently incurred, 
but should also accommodate future growth of assets. As such, banks may have a higher 
level of equity than that yielded by the individual static maximization problem. 
Banks are thus assumed to minimize labour, funding and capital related costs (𝑤𝐿𝐿 +
𝑤𝐹𝐹 + 𝑤𝐾𝐾) subject to the production of a predetermined amount of loans (?̅?1) and other 




𝐶(𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐹 , 𝑤𝑘, 𝑒) = (𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑤𝐹𝐹 + 𝑤𝐾𝐾)𝐿,𝐹,𝐾
𝑚𝑖𝑛                                      
    𝑠. 𝑡.  
                            𝐹(𝑥, 𝑒) ≥ ?̅? 
                                     𝑒 ≥ 𝑒0 
(1) 
where the variables are defined as: 
𝐶 ≡ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑘 (2) 
𝑦1: 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 
𝑦2: 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑤𝐿: 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 
𝑤𝐹: 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 






The price of funding is computed as the ratio between the flow of interest paid and the 
stock of interest bearing liabilities and the price of labour is defined as the ratio between 
labour costs and the number of employees, whereas the price of capital was proxied by the 
ratio between the sum of depreciation and general administrative costs (excluding labour) 
and the stock of tangible and intangible assets. 
It is well known that banks, as is true with other firms, either due to agency problems or 
due to differences in managerial ability, do not strictly behave as profit maximizers, and 
some banks are closer to optimal behaviour than others. Furthermore, as usual in empirical 
applications, the performance of each bank is also affected by random factors, and the 
variables used in the estimations may be subject to measurement error. Hence, in order to 
analyse the cost efficiency of Portuguese banks since the early nineties, the cost function 
stemming from (1) is estimated using SFA models. The main equation to be estimated in the 




𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶(𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤𝑤,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡) (3) 
where 𝐶(𝑡𝑡 , 𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤𝑤,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) represents the estimated cost frontier and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 are banks' 
actual costs, so that a banks' observed costs are bounded below by the sum of the estimated 
cost frontier and a random error (𝑣𝑖,𝑡) which is assumed to follow an i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
distribution and accounts for measurement error of the level of costs, as well as for the effect 
of other random uncontrollable shocks. The sum of 𝑙𝑛𝐶(𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤𝑤,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
constitutes the stochastic frontier, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is a non-negative random variable which measures 
cost inefficiency as the difference between realized cost and the stochastic cost frontier. 
There are several models established in the literature which make different assumptions 
about the distribution of 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. Battese and Coelli (1995) assume that the 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 are 
independently distributed as truncations at zero of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖,𝑡, 𝜎𝑢
2) distribution, where 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡𝛿 and, in turn, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of firm specific and time varying variables and δ is a 
vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated. This specification has the advantage of 
allowing for an interpretation of how some selected variables (those included in 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) are 
related with estimated cost efficiency. The variables included in 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 were the ratio of non-
performing loans outstanding for less than one year to granted loans (NPL) as a measure of 
credit risk, banks' credit market share (Msc) as a measure of relative size, ROE and ROA as 
profitability measures, the equity to assets ratio (Cap. Ratio) and a measure of liquidity 
defined as the ratio of volatile assets to volatile liabilities (Liq. Ratio). 
An alternative model, proposed in Battese and Coelli (1992) defines 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 as follows: 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖exp (−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)) (4) 
where 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the 
𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) distribution and μ and η are parameters to be estimated. In this specification, 
inefficiency is firm specific and is allowed to vary through time even though, unlike in the 
model proposed in Battese and Coelli (1995), the ranking of firms remains constant through 
time. If η is not found to be statistically significant, it can be constrained to zero, so as to 
maximize the degrees of freedom by estimating no more parameters than needed. The cost 




𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤𝑤,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 𝐶𝑖,𝑡⁄  ∈ (0,1] (5) 
A fully efficient bank's actual cost is on the cost frontier, so that its efficiency is 100%, 
whereas an 𝑥% efficient bank's actual cost is above the frontier, so that it could theoretically 
produce the same output with only 𝑥% of its actual cost. 
In order to provide a good approximation to the true cost function while preserving the 
available degrees of freedom and avoiding multicollinearity problems, the choice of the 
functional form in which the cost function is specified should obtain a balance between 
flexibility and parsimony. While the Cobb-Douglas specification is acknowledged to be too 
restrictive, the translog functional form provides a flexible local approximation and the 
Fourier functional form provides a global approximation. Berger and Mester (1997) found 
the difference between the two latter functional forms to be statistically but not economically 
relevant. Hence, and given the relatively small number of observations in our sample, the 
cost function is estimated using a translog functional form, which can be written as: 
 




2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑟 ∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑟  
            + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑘
1
2
(∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑟,𝑠𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑠𝑟 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑙,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑘 ) + 




2 +𝑟𝑘  
            + ∑ 𝛾𝑒,𝑘𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛾𝑒,𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑟 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                           
(6) 
where the usual theoretical restrictions stemming from duality theory (i.e. symmetry and 
linear homogeneity in prices) are imposed: 






= 0, ∀ 𝑟 
∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑙
𝑙











In  practice,  symmetry  is  implicitly  imposed  in  the specification of the estimated 
equation whereas homogeneity is obtained by normalizing input prices and total cost by 𝑤𝑘. 
The data are expressed as deviations from the overall sample mean, so that the first order 
coefficients correspond to the elasticities evaluated at the sample mean. The associated cost 








were not imposed since they hold only under the assumption that no allocative 
inefficiency exists. Hence, our measure of X-inefficiency comprises both technical and 
allocative inefficiency. 
The dataset used in this study was obtained from banks’ financial statements reported to 
Banco de Portugal. The database comprises an unbalanced panel of yearly data for all banks 
operating in Portugal from 1991 to 2006.
46,47
  Total loans were adjusted for securitization, 
essentially since the originating bank is generally still responsible for servicing securitized 
loans. Hence, if this correction were not to be undertaken, the cost efficiency of banks 
involved in securitization operations would be underestimated.
48
 Non-per- forming loans are 
not included in the definition of output since they are essentially a non-income producing 
item in banks’ balance sheet. Hence, this procedure accounts for different levels of credit 
risk in banks’ loan portfolios and implicitly corrects for the differences in the level and in the 
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 As argued in the Introduction, the covered period includes the extremely important preparation for and pre-
crisis membership of the euro area and it excludes data from 2007 due to the perturbations related to the 
financial crisis. 
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 Similarly to other papers, such as Fiorentino et al. (2006), Fries and Taci (2005) and Lang and Welzel 
(1996), the cost function was estimated using nominal data. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, the model was 
also estimated using deflated data and the results (not shown but available upon request) were broadly 
unchanged. 
48
 Securitization in Portugal began in 1997 and grew rapidly in the following years, accounting for around 6 % 
of aggregate loans outstanding in 2004. Furthermore, considerable heterogeneity was present among banks, 





quality of banks’ screening and monitoring activities of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
Note, however, that this argument implicitly assumes that banks’ loan portfolios are 
homogeneous. In practice, each bank may target different loan segments which have 
different levels of credit risk associated. Even though some effort was made in the selection 
of a sample of banks with a relatively similar activity in order to mitigate this problem, a full 
solution would involve defining a separate output for different categories of loans. In our 
case, this was not viable since it would imply a large increase in the number of parameters to 
be estimated, which could not be accommodated within the size of our sample. Data on 
individual rather than consolidated basis was used  since  it  is  available  with greater detail 
for most of the sample period. Since banks which belong to the same financial group often 
have independent brands and activity structures, the analysis relies on bank level data. Since 
banks grew quite rapidly during the period under consideration, stock variables are defined 
as period averages so that meaningful values are between a flow and a stock variable. 
All banks operating in Portugal are required to report financial statements to Banco de 
Portugal. However, in order to ensure that the analysis focuses on banks which operate with 
a similar technology, so that it is legitimate to include  them  in  the  same cost  function, 
only  universal banks with a retail branch network were included in the sample. Further, 
newly created banks were included only from their third year of operation, in order to avoid 
biases associated with short-term misalignments between setup costs and output. 
After applying these filters, a sample of 25 banks, comprising a total of 280 bank-year 
pairs was obtained. For each year, the sample covers at least 77% of total loans, 80% of total 
assets and 87% of total deposits in the Por- ]]tuguese banking system. Further, the market 
share of the five largest banks, when measured in terms of total assets in the sample, 
increased from around 57% in 1992 to over 80% in 2006, in similar fashion to what was 
observed in the whole banking system. 
3. Empirical analysis 
This section presents the main results of the analysis. All results are based on the 
estimation of Eq. 6, imposing the restrictions in 7, and are summarized in Table 2. As stated 
in Sect. 2, since the data are expressed as deviations from the overall sample mean, one can 
easily assess relevant elasticities evaluated at the mean by directly analysing single 




direct interpretation are not shown in Table 2.
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 A preliminary analysis of estimation results 
shows that the elasticity of cost with respect to each of the input prices is positive. 
Furthermore, the input price to which costs react most is the price of funding, which is not 
surprising considering that funding costs constitute the highest share of total costs. The sum 
of the parameters on the two outputs is close to one, indicating close to constant returns to 
scale at the sample mean. The fact that the parameter on the interaction term between the 
two outputs  is  negative  indicates  that  there  are  scope economies  in  the  joint  
production  of  loans  and  other earning assets. There is statistically significant cost reducing 
technological progress at the sample mean and banks with higher levels of equity tend to 
have lower costs with other inputs. The estimate for 𝛾 indicates the percentage of the total 
error’s variance which is accounted for by cost inefficiency rather than by the classical 
random error and the fact that it is statistically significant in every specification provides 
evidence that the estimation of the cost function as a frontier is appropriate. 
The first column of the table provides the results for models where estimated 
inefficiency is defined as a function of a series of bank characteristics. Banks with a higher 
ratio between the flow of non-performing loans and total loans granted show up to be more 
cost inefficient. This result suggests that loan delinquency works as a proxy for manager 
skill, i.e. managers who are poor at monitoring and screening loans are also poor at 
controlling costs. Banks with a larger market share in loans show up to be more cost 
efficient, which could indicate that larger banks are able to attract more competent managers. 
This hypothesis could in turn reflect larger salaries and perks than smaller banks able to pay 
to their top management as well as the prestige that comes from leading the largest banks. 
More capitalized banks show up to be less cost efficient, as do those with a higher liquidity 
ratio. This suggests that banks with less aggressive liquidity management also tend to be less 
cost efficient. One should nonetheless note that banks that choose to hold lower liquidity 
buffers will be subject to higher funding liquidity risk, which may be underpriced in 
wholesale markets in times of smooth market functioning, such as the one that prevailed 
during the sample period. The positive coefficient on the time trend indicates that, for the 
same value of loan delinquency, relative size and liquidity and capital ratios, banks’ cost 
efficiency would have decreased through time. 
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In the third column of Table 2, the estimate for bank specific cost inefficiency is defined 
as a function of time, as shown in Eq. 4. However, since the estimate for 𝜂 was not found to 
be statistically significant, the next column of the table presents estimation results in which it 
is restricted to zero in order to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom due to the estimation of 
redundant parameters. This is the specification used for the analysis whose results are 
presented in detail in the following subsections, the first of which presents results concerning 
estimated marginal costs for each bank as well as their behaviour over time. The next sub- 
section discusses the estimates for banks’ shadow cost of equity capital. The third subsection 
discusses results concerning scale economies. The following subsections present results 
concerning cost efficiency and technological progress. In the last subsection changes in total 
factor productivity are quantified and decomposed in order to assess whether they were 
driven mainly by changes in the optimum technology, by the technology of each bank 
approaching the best practices, or simply by banks moving to a different point in the same 
cost function. 
3.1 Marginal Costs 
Using the estimated parameters for the cost function, marginal cost estimates for the 









  (9) 
Note that  Eq. 9  yields  bank  specific  marginal  cost estimates for both the production 
of bank loans and of other earning assets. Hence, the time-series presented in Table 3 were 
constructed by aggregating the individual estimates, using each bank’s market share in loans 
as weights. Since funding costs constitute a major share of banks’ variable costs and interest 
rates have decreased markedly during the period under analysis, the fact that the marginal 
cost estimates   have   decreased   sharply   over   time   is   not surprising (Fig. 1). 
Nonetheless, an interesting question is whether real resource marginal costs also decreased 
through time. A proxy for banks’ non-financial marginal cost is obtained by deducing the 
estimated marginal cost for each bank of the corresponding price of funding. As shown in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, this measure also presents a decreasing trend, indicating that, 
despite contributing to the profile observed in marginal costs through time, the behaviour of 




under analysis there was a change in the structure of banks’ loan portfolio, with an increase 
in the share of loans to households as opposed to a decrease in the weight of loans to the 
public sector. This structural change should have contributed to an increase in the marginal 
cost of total loans. As such, the significant reduction in the estimated operational marginal 
cost of loans was not driven by changes in the composition of the loan portfolio. 
As illustrated in Fig. 2 and documented in Table 3, the marginal cost of loans has 
generally been higher than that of other earning assets, indicating that it is more resource 
consuming to provide an additional loan than it is to invest in securities, which should be 
related with the screening and monitoring costs involved in granting loans. However, this 
difference has become less relevant through time. In order to understand this development, 
one should keep inmind that  the  output which is defined as other earning assets includes 
quite heterogeneous products. Furthermore, during the sample period there have been 
changes to the composition of this output. In fact, whereas during the early 1990’s banks had 
significant resources invested in government bonds and deposits with the central bank, with 
the liberalization of the banking system and financial innovation banks started to invest in 
more sophisticated assets which, due to their greater complexity, require the use of more 
resources. 
Furthermore, using data on banks’ loan related interest income and stock of outstanding 
loans, one may compute an implicit interest rate on loans, as shown in column 7 of Table 3. 
Deducing the marginal cost from this interest rate, a measure of banks’ price cost margin is 
obtained. According  to  the  results  shown  in  the  last  column  of Table 3 and in Fig. 3, 
this measure has decreased through time, most notably during the liberalisation period and in 
the run up to euro area accession. This is consistent with the result found in Boucinha and 
Ribeiro (2009), according to which competition in the banking system has increased during 
the period under scrutiny.
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 The measure of implicit interest rate used is computed based on interest income and loan stocks which do 
not include non-performing loans. Hence, it is a proxy for the interest rate that banks charge their costumers, 
which should be higher than the average interest rate that they actually receive due to loan delinquency. Hence, 
the decrease in non-performing loans observed throughout the sample period should also have contributed to 
the observed decrease in banks’ price-cost margin. Nonetheless, constructing a measure of interest rate which is 
a lower bound for the one that banks actually receive, since it includes non-performing loans but not the 
interest on these loans, the decreasing pattern found for the margin on loans is still present. Hence, this 




3.2 Shadow cost of equity 
Since the estimated cost function includes the level of equity as a fixed input, it allows 










  (10) 
The rationale underlying the computation of the shadow cost of equity is to provide a 
measure of how much banks are willing to pay for equity, since it indicates the amount that 
they would save in other costs as a result of an increase in the level of equity.
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As shown in Fig. 4 the time series obtained by aggregating the estimates for the shadow 
cost of equity is strongly correlated with market interest rates and with banks’ weighted 
average cost of deposit and market debt funding. This result is consistent with shareholder 
capital being a source of funding in itself, so that funding costs are the ones which are most 
affected by the level of equity. 
Even though it is in general higher that the short-term money market interest rate, the 
obtained measure of the shadow cost of equity, presented in Table 4, is lower than what is 
generally acknowledged to be a reasonable value for the actual price of equity. This result is 
not surprising and supports our choice of modelling equity capital as a quasi-fixed rather 
than a variable input, since it suggests that the regulatory and reputation constraints to the 
level of equity are in fact relevant, so that banks hold a higher level of equity capital than the 
one which would solve their static unconstrained optimization problem. 
With the purpose of investigating what drives differences in banks’ shadow cost of 
equity, this variable was regressed upon a set of bank specific variables, including each 
bank’s capital ratio and return on equity and dummy variables which identify public banks, 
branches of credit institutions whose head office is in foreign countries and relatively large 
banks (the 60 % larger banks in  each year).
52
 In order to avoid simultaneity issues 
concerning the shadow cost of equity and banks’ capital ratio and return on equity, the lag 
rather than the contemporary value of these variables is used. Since the dummy variable 
                                                          
51
 One must bear in mind the limitations of the model employed, by operating under the framework of a 
static optimization model estimated using non-consolidated accounting data. 
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 The fact that the dependent variable of this regression is itself an estimate means that the standard errors 




which identifies branches of credit institutions whose head office is in foreign countries is 
time invariant, identification of the coefficient on this variable is not possible in a regression 
which includes bank specific fixed-effects. Hence, both fixed-effects and random-effects 
regressions are shown. 
The results of these regressions, shown in Table 5, show a positive relationship between 
banks’ capital ratio and the corresponding shadow cost of equity, but the coefficient has a 
high standard deviation. More profitable banks are found to have a higher shadow cost of 
equity, which may reflect higher risk incurred by the bank. Possibly reflecting lower 
perceived risk, state owned banks tend to have a lower shadow cost of equity. Branches of 
credit institutions whose head office is in foreign countries generally represent a relatively 
small portion of their banking group’s assets, so that their activity hardly influences the 
group’s credit rating and they often resort directly to the head office in order to obtain 
funding. Hence, it is not surprising to find that these banks tend to have a lower shadow cost 
of equity on average. Conversely, larger banks, which tend to be more transparent and whose 
equity is more likely to be traded in public markets, tend to have a higher shadow cost of 
equity. 
3.3 Scale economies 
The assessment of scale economies has been the subject of extensive discussion in the 
literature. Even though there are many theoretical arguments supporting their existence and 
they are typically invoked by bank managers as a motivation for mergers, empirical studies 
often fail to find them in the data. The identification of scale economies has relevant 
implications since it allows for inference on the adequacy  of  the  market  structure  from  a  
technological point of view. 
This section assesses the presence of scale economies since the liberalization of the 




𝑟   
(11) 
An elasticity of cost with respect to total loans smaller (larger) than one is obtained in 
the presence of scale economies (diseconomies). As  shown  in  Table 6,  scale diseconomies 
(as defined above) were found during the early 1990’s so that, all else equal, an increase in 




estimate for the scale parameter is slightly below one, albeit not statistically different from 
one, indicating virtually constant returns to scale. One should, nonetheless, keep in mind that 
the elasticity computed according to Eq. 11 is a measure of short-run or constrained scale 
economies, since the level of equity is held fixed. Furthermore, since the definition of cost 
employed does   not   include   the   cost   of   equity, the measure of scale economies 
presented above is actually a measure of cash flow cost economies. This measure is likely to 
overestimate the true scale parameter, since the fact that the level of equity is held fixed 
implies that any increase in output must be totally financed by interest bearing debt, so that 
the cost of debt is forced to increase more than would be realistic. 
A measure of scale economies which allows for the level of capital to change in 
response to changes in output could be obtained by estimating a cost function where equity 
is treated similarly to the other inputs. However, as men tioned above, we do not think that 
this would be an optimal solution, as there are important constraints to the choice of banks’ 
level of equity capital. Furthermore, even in the more recent period, only a small number of 
Portuguese banks are listed in the stock exchange market, so that it is not straightforward to 
obtain estimates for the cost of equity. 
Alternatively, as outlined in Hughes et al. (2001), cit- ing  an  original  proposal  by  
Hughes  (1999),  one  can compute   a   measure   of   economic   scale   economies assuming 
that the observed level of equity capital minimizes economic cost at the shadow price of 
equity, since it then holds that: 
𝐶(𝑡, 𝑦𝑟 , 𝑤𝑘, 𝑤𝑒
∗) = 𝐶(𝑡, 𝑦𝑟 , 𝑤𝑘, 𝑒) + 𝑤𝑒
∗𝑒 (12) 
From the expression above, one can compute a measure of economic scale economies 
as: 
𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ∑





𝐶(𝑡, 𝑦𝑟 , 𝑤𝑘, 𝑤𝑒
∗)
 (13) 
Since the level of equity capital 𝑒 minimizes economic cost, the constrained marginal 












From this result and the definition of the shadow cost of equity in equation 10, 
expression 13 may be written as: 
𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ∑




















An aggregate time-series of the estimates for scale economies obtained through the 
aggregation of the individual estimates yielded by the computation of Eq. 16 is presented in 
Table 6. While this measure presents the same decreasing profile as the constrained measure, 
its level is considerably lower at each year. Hence, accounting for the fact that banks’ level 
of capital is allowed to vary according to changes in banks’ output, one finds statistically 
significant scale economies for the full period under scrutiny, which suggests that the 
concentration process observed in the Portuguese banking system was at least partly driven 
by the opportunity to increase productive efficiency. 
Estimated scale economies show up to be stronger at the end of the sample when 
compared to the early 1990’s. This result is likely to be linked with the changes to banks’ 
technology brought about by technological progress. In fact, the increasing automation of 
services should have allowed for a decrease in banks’ variable costs at the expense of a more 
significant initial investment in technology, such as storage and processing of information 
and communication facilities. These technological developments in turn allowed for the 
setup of a dense ATM net- work and of other remote-delivery outlets such as websites, with 
the corresponding savings in costs associated with the need for less employees and branches. 
Another factor possibly contributing to the higher scale economies found in the more recent 
period was the increasing internationalization of banking activity brought about by 
technological progress, financial innovation and increasing economic integration among EU 




borders brought about new growth opportunities while, to some extent, exposed them to 
increased competition from non-resident banks. Moreover, even the largest banks in the 
Portuguese financial system are relatively small when compared to their international 
counterparts. 
3.4 Cost efficiency 
Table 7 presents the obtained estimates for the cost efficiency of Portuguese banks 
between 1992 and 2006. As indicated above, results are based on a specification which does 
not include determinants of inefficiency. Further, 𝜂 — the parameter for the change in cost 
efficiency through time — was not found to be statistically significant, and so was 
constrained to zero. Hence, the distance at which each bank stands from the cost frontier 
representing best practices does not seem to have changed during the period under scrutiny.
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The aggregate estimate for inefficiency lies close to 84%, suggesting that Portuguese banks 
could theoretically have produced the same output while incurring only 94 % of their actual 
costs. Some heterogeneity across banks was found, with estimated efficiency scores ranging 
from a minimum of 78% to a maximum of 96%. 
3.5 Technological progress 
The estimated cost function also includes a time trend as a translog term, which allows 
for the computation of both Hicksian neutral and non neutral technological progress. Total 
cost reducing technological progress, i.e., shifts to the frontier brought about by the adoption 





  As shown in Table 8, 
technological progress was identified for the full   period   under   consideration.   These   
developments should be regarded in the context of global financial inte- gration, which 
catalysed the swift adoption of more effi- cient technology. The estimate for technological 
progress found for 2006 should be interpreted as indicating that, in this  year,  Portuguese  
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 The fact that the aggregate value of the cost efficiency estimate is not constant even though each bank’s 
efficiency estimate is time invariant is motivated by a composition effect. In fact, due to changes in banks’ 
market shares, the weights used in aggregation (the value of granted loans) are not constant and, due to 
mergers/acquisitions and to the emergence of new banks, estimation relies on an unbalanced panel of data. 
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 Note that this measure underestimates technological progress when the quality/variety of products 




banks  operating  according  to  the industry’s best practices could produce the same output 
as in the previous year incurring 2.2% lower total costs. 
3.6 Total factor productivity growth 
In this section the parameters of the estimated cost function are used to compute a 
measure of total factor productivity change (TFPC) which may be decomposed into the 
effect of cost efficiency change (EC), of technological progress (TC) and of returns to scale 
(RTS) (see Bauer (1990) for details): 



































where er is the elasticity of cost with respect to output r and each term of the 
decomposition has an interesting inter- pretation. In fact, according to the expression above, 
total factor productivity change comprises catching-up to the cost frontier (cost efficiency 
change), shifts in the frontier itself over time (technical progress) and shifts along the 
frontier (returns to scale component). The effect of returns to scale represents the pure 
impact on total costs stemming from changes in output after allowing for input requirements 
and it is positive if a bank with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale increases (decreases) 
its production. 
It should be taken into account that Eq. 18 is presented as proposed in Bauer (1990), 
with the necessary changes to account for the inclusion of equity in the estimated cost 
function. As such, the concept of economic scale econo- mies (ESE) is used instead of the 




The results for total factor productivity change in the Portuguese banking sector during 
the period under consideration are summarized in Table 9 and in Fig. 5. The most striking 
result is that total factor productivity change has been mainly driven by technological 
progress, which became stronger throughout the sample period. Scale efficiency change also 
made a positive contribution towards total factor productivity growth, especially in the years 
when   the   largest   mergers   occurred.   Cost   efficiency remained virtually constant 
throughout the period. Combining the three effects, one finds that there was consistent total 
factor productivity growth observed during the period under consideration. The value of total 
factor productivity growth was close to 3% during the 1990’s, it was boosted by gains in 
returns to scale during the large mergers observed around the turn of the century, and later 
returned to a value close to that observed earlier. 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyses the production technology of Portuguese banks during the 1992–
2006 period through the estimation of a translog cost frontier. Banks are modelled as firms 
which produce loans and other earning assets, choosing the cost minimizing combination of 
labour, cap- ital and interest bearing debt, subject to holding a given level of equity. 
Several different specifications were tested for the distribution  of  estimated  
inefficiency.  Banks with higher credit risk and with more idle liquidity were found to be 
more cost inefficient, possibly reflecting the fact that these variables are in a way proxies for 
manager quality/ sophistication. Banks with higher capital ratios were also identified as 
being less cost-efficient. On the other hand, relatively larger banks were found to be more 
cost efficient, which could indicate, that larger banks are able to attract more competent 
managers. The more detailed analysis whose results are briefly summarised below was 
carried out based on the estimation results of a simpler model where no determinants of 
inefficiency were included. 
Portuguese banks’ marginal costs in the production of loans and other earning assets 
were found to follow to a large extent the decline in nominal interest rates observed 
throughout the period under consideration. Still, a significant part of the decrease in total 




for this measure corresponding to lending activity was in general higher than that for other 
earning assets, even though the difference became  less relevant  in  the more recent period, 
in which the value of the real resource marginal costs ranged between 1 and 1.3 %. 
Banks’ capital structure was accounted for in the analysis by including equity as a quasi-
fixed input in the cost function. This procedure allowed for the computation of estimates for 
banks’ shadow cost of equity, which should be interpreted as a lower bound to banks’ true 
willingness to pay for equity capital. Hence, it is not surprising to find that they are lower 
than levels compatible with usually accepted equity risk premia. Furthermore, the estimated 
shadow cost of equity follows quite closely the developments in market interest rates. 
On average, Portuguese banks were found to operate with a cost inefficiency level 
around 17%, indicating that they could theoretically produce the same output incurring only 
83% of their actual cost.  The magnitude of cost reducing technological progress was found 
to be slightly above 2% throughout the period. Accounting for banks’ capital structure, 
significant scale economies were found, especially in the more recent years. Further, the 
results point to the existence of economies of scope in the joint production of loans and other 
earning assets. 
Against the background of the liberalization and privatization of the banking system and 
of increasing financial innovation, the cost frontier representing best practices has shifted 
downwards over time. The distance between banks’ actual costs and the cost frontier, on the 
other hand, has not changed significantly. Since banks with increasing returns to scale 
increased their production, there was a move along the cost function which also contributed 
to an increase in productivity. 
Combining these results, estimates for total factor productivity change were computed, 
amounting to 3.2 % each year on average, which results in a total productivity increase close 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Elasticity of banks' costs with respect to the level of deposits 
 
Notes: This test is performed by estimating a cost function which excludes interest paid 
on deposits from the definition of total cost (the dependent variable) and from the 
computation of the price of funding and includes the level of deposits as a fixed input. If the 
elasticity of costs with other inputs with respect to the level of deposits is negative (positive), 
then deposits behave as inputs (outputs) and should be modelled as such. Total loans 



















Year Estimate at weighted 
sample mean






Cost frontier estimation results 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in italics. In the cost function specification, the 
constant and most cross terms were omitted as they have no direct interpretation. The 




ln(W L) 0.1293 0.1381 0.1385
0.02 0.02 0.02
ln(W F ) 0.5966 0.6034 0.6028
0.02 0.02 0.02
ln(y 1 ) 0.6314 0.5768 0.5764
0.01 0.02 0.01
ln(y 2 ) 0.4562 0.4716 0.4718
0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(y 1 )*ln(y 2 ) -0.2992 -0.2458 -0.2454
0.02 0.02 0.02
t -0.0300 -0.0188 -0.0186
0.00 0.00 0.00





















Marginal cost estimates at the weighted sample mean (per cent) 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1992 15.08 13.13 16.72 10.74 4.34 2.39 17.15 2.07
1993 12.79 11.13 13.17 8.94 3.85 2.19 15.45 2.66
1994 10.46 9.00 11.23 7.01 3.45 1.99 13.08 2.62
1995 10.21 9.03 9.79 7.09 3.11 1.94 12.26 2.05
1996 8.47 7.71 7.27 5.71 2.76 2.00 10.72 2.26
1997 7.16 6.65 5.61 4.65 2.51 2.00 9.24 2.08
1998 5.81 5.43 4.23 3.59 2.22 1.84 7.44 1.63
1999 4.72 4.30 2.96 2.65 2.07 1.66 5.78 1.06
2000 5.15 4.60 4.39 3.28 1.87 1.32 6.13 0.98
2001 5.07 4.64 4.26 3.47 1.60 1.17 6.33 1.26
2002 4.26 4.09 3.32 2.76 1.49 1.32 4.87 0.61
2003 3.54 3.50 2.33 2.28 1.26 1.22 4.56 1.02
2004 3.28 3.25 2.11 2.00 1.27 1.24 4.21 0.93
2005 3.42 3.36 2.18 2.07 1.35 1.30 4.05 0.63
2006 3.72 3.85 3.08 2.61 1.12 1.25 4.76 1.04
Real resource 

























The shadow cost of equity (per cent) 
 




Determinants of the shadow cost of equity 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in italics. Time dummies and a constant were 




(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1992 20.28 16.72 11.86 7.56 10.74
1993 15.60 13.17 10.33 7.41 8.94
1994 11.33 11.23 10.48 6.97 7.01
1995 9.84 9.79 11.47 6.54 7.09
1996 7.42 7.27 8.56 6.29 5.71
1997 6.22 5.61 6.36 6.10 4.65
1998 5.88 4.23 4.88 6.41 3.59
1999 4.89 2.96 4.78 6.50 2.65
2000 6.19 4.39 5.60 6.04 3.28
2001 6.98 4.26 5.16 5.85 3.47
2002 5.55 3.32 5.01 6.13 2.76
2003 3.75 2.33 4.18 6.36 2.28
2004 3.34 2.11 4.14 6.33 2.00
2005 2.88 2.18 3.44 5.69 2.07
2006 1.86 3.08 3.92 5.52 2.61
Implicit price of 
funding


































Notes: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the computation of 
means. SE denotes scale economies as defined in Equation (11) and ESE refers to economic 




1992 1.0658 0.05 0.9478 0.00
1993 1.0481 0.10 0.9431 0.00
1994 1.0227 0.40 0.9361 0.00
1995 1.0056 0.83 0.9353 0.00
1996 0.9946 0.82 0.9341 0.00
1997 0.9896 0.65 0.9347 0.00
1998 0.9872 0.60 0.9220 0.00
1999 0.9897 0.73 0.9217 0.00
2000 0.9806 0.52 0.9103 0.00
2001 0.9791 0.55 0.9057 0.00
2002 0.9798 0.56 0.9065 0.00
2003 0.9640 0.29 0.9029 0.00
2004 0.9476 0.16 0.8900 0.00
2005 0.9415 0.11 0.8975 0.00
2006 0.9364 0.12 0.9049 0.00
1992-2004 0.9712 0.33 0.9099 0.00
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Total factor productivity growth (per cent 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
1993 0.67 0.24 -2.41 3.32
1994 0.64 -0.05 -2.30 2.89
1995 0.54 -0.10 -2.15 2.59
1996 0.35 -0.11 -2.07 2.31
1997 0.51 -0.08 -2.13 2.55
1998 1.74 -0.85 -2.12 3.02
1999 1.22 -0.05 -2.19 3.36
2000 4.42 -0.46 -2.48 6.43
2001 2.22 -0.24 -2.53 4.51
2002 0.31 0.07 -2.42 2.80
2003 0.65 0.07 -2.31 3.02
2004 1.74 0.23 -2.04 4.01
2005 0.97 -0.10 -2.03 2.90
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Portfolio Rebalancing and the Transmission of 
Large-Scale Asset Programs: Evidence from the Euro Area 




One of the main channels of transmission of large-scale asset programs is the so-called 
portfolio rebalancing channel, whereby, in a context of low yields, investors have incentives 
to shift their investments towards assets with higher expected returns. Using granular, 
security-by-security information on the composition of financial portfolios of all aggregate 
institutional sectors in the euro area countries, we document how asset allocation evolved 
around the announcement of ECB asset purchase programme (APP). In order to explore the 
role played by APP in tilting asset allocation, we exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
impact of the programme on the valuation of the financial portfolio held by each sector in 
Mach 2014, well before the introduction of asset purchases. We then zoom in on each of the 
euro area’s largest banks in order to investigate the programme’s impact on bank lending. 
Interestingly, our findings suggest that portfolio rebalancing manifested in a distinct form 
across euro area countries. In more vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances 
and relatively high risk premia remain, APP was mostly reflected into a rebalancing towards 
riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, where constraints on loan demand and supply 
are less significant, the rebalancing was observed mostly in terms of bank loans. 
 
JEL classification: E44, E51, G21. 
 
Keywords: quantitative easing, unconventional monetary policy, portfolio rebalancing, 
search for yield. 
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The crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and the 
accompanying recession provoked the development of a new set of monetary policy tools. 
Central banks in all main developed countries reacted to the crisis by cutting official rates 
and adopting a wide range of unconventional measures. A key such measure is asset 
purchase programs, whereby the central bank aims at lowering long-term yields through 
purchases of bonds. These programs were seen as a necessary monetary policy tool to 
provide stimulus once policy rates approached their effective lower bound. Early programs 
include the US QE1, QE2 and QE3 programs undertaken by the Federal Reserve starting in 
2008 and similar policies initiated by the Bank of England in early 2009. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Expanded 
Asset Purchase Program (APP). This program was implemented later than the US and UK 
programs, against the backdrop of a very prolonged economic downturn in the Euro area 
which coincided with historically low inflation. The ECB announced the APP, on 22 January 
2015 and the implementation started in March of 2015.
55
 
A key question about asset purchase programs is whether they work, in the sense of 
generating a positive impact on macro-economic developments and, if so, through which 
channel. A direct impact from reduced interest rates is unlikely to be important for asset 
purchase programs (see Stein 2012).
56
 Another possible channel is signaling (whereby asset 
purchases serve as a commitment device for relatively high future inflation targets). 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) reject this channel for the US. Instead, these 
authors suggest that the US QE programs have worked largely through a narrower channel, 
increasing the price of the specific assets purchased under the program, with possible 
spillovers depending on institutional features and economic conditions.  
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 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/asset-purchase.en.html. 
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 This is because it is argued that these programs reduce (real) long-term interest rates mainly by 
compressing the term-premium incorporated in yields, rather than the expected levels of future short-term rate. 
Under these conditions, firms can finance themselves at a cheaper rate by issuing longer-term securities, but the 
(opportunity) cost of investing in the marginal project does not diminish as its return has to be confronted with 
the expected return achieved by investing in a sequence of short-term securities, which remains unchanged. In a 
few words, LSAPs are likely to elicit a financing response on the part of firms, as opposed to a change in their 




A related channel, widely emphasized in the policy debate, is the portfolio rebalancing 
channel: asset purchase programs exert pressure on the supply of credit to the riskier 
segments of the economy, typically those suffering the most from credit supply restrictions 
during downturns as, by reducing yields on safe long-term securities, investors have 
incentives to shift their investments towards assets with higher expected returns, thus taking 
on more risk. This search-for yield is argued to represent an important channel of 
transmission of purchase programs, if not the main one, as it implies that the monetary 
stimulus is passed-through onto sectors which, unlike issuers of securities which are eligible 
for the central bank purchases, cannot directly benefit of the program. Indeed, portfolio 
rebalancing is deemed to be able to benefit even SMEs, which typically do not issue 
securities on financial markets, by stimulating banks’ supply of loans to this sector. 
According to a different view, portfolio rebalancing is instead a perverse byproduct of asset 
purchase programs as it implies an increased risk taking that may sow the seeds for future 
crises.
57
 It is therefore crucial to document not only if portfolio rebalancing takes place, but 
also for which types of investors and assets.  
This study aims at exploring the relevance of portfolio rebalancing for the transmission 
of the APP by exploiting granular information on the composition of security portfolios for 
all aggregate holding sectors in euro area countries. The announcement and introduction of 
the APP was associated with a positive impact on financial markets overall. Long-term 
yields have declined sharply over the period when the debate on a possible purchase program 
by the ECB has intensified. At the end of 2013 10–year benchmark government bond yields 
in the euro area started to decline sharply and kept doing so until the end of March 2015, 
right after purchases actually began. The prominent role played by APP in explaining such 
massive decline in yields has been demonstrated in analyses based on an event study 
methodology (Altavilla et al., 2015). 
The core of our analysis consists in an examination of whether sectors that experienced 
higher gains rebalanced toward riskier assets, compared to holding sectors with smaller 
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gains. We essentially take the initial impact on financial prices as a given, and ask to what 
extent it had a secondary effect on asset allocations across different sectors and countries 
over the period 2014Q1 and 2015Q2, the first data point after the decline in yields induced 
by expectations of the APP. In each euro–area country, we consider the securities held by the 
following institutional sectors: banks, money-market funds, insurance corporations, pension 
funds, other financial corporations, non-financial corporations, households (including non-
profit institutions serving households), general governments and rest of the world.
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Our identification strategy relies on two assumptions. One is that, across holding 
sectors, incentives for rebalancing are commensurate to the changes in the value of the 
portfolio. If, prior to the yield decline phase, a sector was holding securities whose yields has 
diminished little, then such sector is supposed to be have lower incentives to search-for yield 
and rebalance towards riskier (higher-yield) securities. This means that we can exploit cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the exposure to the APP shock, as measured by the valuation gains 
experienced against the background of the announcement and introduction of APP. The 
change in the value of the financial portfolios held in Mach 2014 by each institutional sector 
in a given country (hereinafter, holding sector) varied substantially. For example, the 25
th
 
percentile was a gain of around 2% and the 75
th
 percentile around 4%. 
The second assumption is that we can exploit the granularity of the dataset to address 
one tricky endogeneity issue. If we observed that holding sectors experiencing higher 
valuation gains exhibit a sharper rebalancing towards riskier securities, this would be 
consistent with an increase in the financing needs of riskier issuers, whereby such increased 
credit demand has been met by sectors that typically invest in risky securities and as such 
were more exposed to the APP shock (that is, experienced larger re-valuations of their 
portfolio). This would imply an increase in credit demand by some issuers, rather than 
portfolio rebalancing which is a notion involving an increase in credit supply for risky 
borrowers or issuers. Crucially, the availability of security-by-security information allows 
for the comparison of investment patterns in the same security across different sectors, 
effectively controlling for the credit demand channel. We present results for all securities in 
the dataset but we give a special focus on newly issued debt securities. This is because, by 
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construction, as long as the monetary policy stimulus succeeds in inducing rebalancing for 
the average investor in the economy, this can be accommodated only via an increased 
issuance of riskier securities. Clearly, for outstanding securities, rebalancing towards riskier 
securities by some investors needs to be accommodated by portfolio rebalancing in the 
opposite direction by some other investors. 
It is also crucial to emphasize that purchases under the APP are subject to strict rules 
concerning their cross-country allocation based on euro-area national central banks’ 
individual shares in ECB's capital. This rules out that the ECB was targeting securities in 
specific countries and the related possible endogeneity issues. 
We will be using yields or spreads as risk indicators (similar to the method used by 
Becker and Ivashina 2015 to examine cyclical variation in the risk appetite in US insurance 
portfolios), but we will also look at specific dimensions of risk, such as the rating and the 
residual maturity. 
Throughout our analysis we will also assess portfolio rebalancing across vulnerable and 
less vulnerable countries.
59
 As will be shown, different patterns will be documented between 
these two groups of countries. Interest in these geographical patterns is warranted by the fact 
that, in the context of financial fragmentation that emerged with the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis, different conditions for credit and lending supply have been observed in the two areas. 
The analysis of rebalancing in debt security portfolios allows for an assessment of 
effects on the supply of credit in the form of securities. However, in the euro area, bank 
lending constitutes the key source of financing for most firms – especially SMEs. We 
estimate the effect of the APP on bank lending by exploiting a detailed dataset for each of 
the largest twenty five banking groups in the euro area. 
For each bank we compute the exposure to the APP shock in line with what is done for 
sectoral holdings, that is by considering the increase in the value of financial portfolios held 
at before the announcement of the APP. We then measure whether this is related to the 
amount of loans subsequently extended to the real economy, controlling for possible 
heterogeneity in demand conditions faced by lenders operating in different countries.  
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The results of our analysis, focusing on newly issued securities, show no statistically 
significant relationship between portfolio rebalancing patterns across sectors and the 
exposure to the APP shock for the euro area as a whole. A relationship can however be 
documented when focusing on more vulnerable economies only, in particular in what 
concerns corporate bonds held and credit (but not maturity or currency) risk. For what 
concerns lending activity, banks more exposed to the APP displayed larger reductions in the 
interest rates applied on new loans to households and, in less vulnerable countries, higher 
growth of credit extended to non-financial corporations. One possible explanation for our 
distinct findings across country groups is that in non-vulnerable countries spreads were 
already so compressed to begin with that, against a background of persisting home-bias, 
engaging in search for yield would require an unfeasibly large change in portfolio 
composition. Relative returns on different types of assets would then favour rebalancing 
towards lending activity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 provides a brief description of the novel dataset used. Section 4 
presents the econometric exercises. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes. 
2. The related literature 
Several recent papers attempt to assess the effects of asset purchase programs. One 
group of papers aims at empirically documenting the impact on asset prices and bond yields. 
They rely on granular and high-frequency data to identify the response of market prices for 
individual securities around announcements of asset purchase programs by central banks. 




Other papers use bank-level information to investigate the presence of a bank lending 
channel of asset purchase programs by testing whether banks that end up receiving most of 
the liquidity injected with central bank purchases of long-term bonds have disproportionately 
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 These papers include, among others, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) on FED’s QE,  Joyce 
and Tong (2012) on Bank of England’s program, Krishnamurthy et al (2014) on the ECB’s OMT and SMP, 
Altavilla et al (2015) on APP. A related but different approach is in Wright (2012) who estimates a VAR with 
daily data where the identification is derived from the assumption that monetary policy shocks have high 
variance on days of FOMC meetings. He also finds an impact of monetary policy shocks on governments and 




increased their loan supply. Butt et al (2014), looking at UK’s experience, do not find 
significant effects; Kandrac and Schlusche (2016), instead, find evidence of an operational 
bank-lending channel for the US.  
Other authors attempt to assess the effects of asset purchase programs on real macro-
economic variables using VAR or DSGE models. These papers look at different episodes 
and countries so that results are not always comparable. Nonetheless, the broad message they 
convey is that there is a significant impact of asset purchase programs on the real economy.
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Since the identification in these studies comes from aggregate time series variation, the 
precision with which specific causal mechanisms can be pinpointed is generally weaker. To 
the extent that programs are introduced at non-random times, the results may be confounded. 
Peydrò et al (2016) exploit granular bank-level data on individual security and borrower 
exposures of Italian banks. Their objective is to study how banks’ investment decisions are 
influenced by the monetary policy rate or by the adoption of unconventional monetary policy 
measures, captured by the size of the central bank balance-sheet. They conclude that 
unconventional monetary policy measures do not induce risk-taking in the composition of 
security portfolios nor on lending supply. Compared to Peydrò et al (2016), whose sample 
period ends in 2013, we use a dataset covering a more limited time span but which covers 
the APP. We also analyze security-by-security holdings of all main institutional sectors, not 
just banks, and cover all euro area countries. Another difference is related to the indicator 
adopted to capture unconventional monetary policy (size of central bank balance-sheet) 
which cannot reflect what occurs in anticipation of the actual implementation of such policy 
measures. This approach, adopted in several other papers (e.g., Gambacorta et al., 2014), is 
not suitable for our purposes given our focus on the ECB’s asset purchase program. As 
mentioned, APP started to reflect on the size of the central bank-balance sheet only 
gradually, starting in March 2015, while the price impact on long-term yields took place 
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 Baumeister and Benati (2012) use a Bayesian time-varying parameter structural VAR for a sample of 
advanced economies and argue that a compression in the long-term yield spread exerts a powerful effect on 
both output growth and inflation. Following a broadly similar approach, Kapetanios et al. (2012) studies the 
first round of QE in UK and suggest that QE may have had a peak effect on the level of real GDP of around 1.5 
and 1.25 p.p. on real GDP level and CPI inflation respectively. Chen (2014) finds that the sole LSAPs 
interventions in the US had an insignificant effect on the macro-economy. She finds instead a strong 
effectiveness of the policy involving an extended period of near-zero interest rates, either on output or on 




entirely before that date.
62
 We also exploit bank-level information on security holdings for a 
sample of large banking groups in the euro area but, unlike Peydrò et al (2016), we cannot 
match this information with loan-level data. Nonetheless, we will be able to provide an 
assessment of whether portfolio rebalancing has benefitted loan-supply by integrating our 
dataset with bank-level information on the amount and the cost of the credit extended to 
different sectors, including firms and households.
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Another paper close to ours is Koijen et al (2016). Based on a dataset similar to ours, the 
authors describe the evolution of portfolio composition across institutional sectors in the 
euro area and build a methodology to assess its impact on yields, different from more 
standard event study approaches based on high frequency data. Our focus, instead, is on how 
monetary policy has been affecting the composition of security portfolios. 
3. The data and descriptive evidence 
The security holding statistics (SHS) dataset contains granular information at individual 
ISIN level on securities held in the euro area. In more detail, it includes holdings by residents 
of each euro area and some other EU countries, as collected by the corresponding country, 
and holdings by non-euro area residents in custody in the euro area.
64
 The dataset has a 
widespread coverage, at close to 90 per cent of the universe of debt securities reported in the 
national accounts. The SHS dataset includes also granular information on the portfolio of 
securities held by each of the 25 largest euro area banks. This dataset is matched with bank-
level information on stocks and flows of loans granted to the non-financial private sector and 
on the corresponding interest rates, so as to investigate the impact of the monetary policy 
shock on bank lending to the real economy. 
The first form of rebalancing that can be observed from raw data is across types of 
securities held (Figure 1). A clear rebalancing of portfolios towards equity instruments was 
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 Implicit in our choice is the idea that portfolio rebalancing is a special case of search for yield. From this 
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originate even without actual purchases, as shown by the notorious episode where ECB President Draghi 
committed to do “whatever it takes” to fulfill his keep the central bank’s mandate. 
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 A similar dataset is exploited in Abbassi et al (2015) who uses granular bank-level data from Germany on 
individual security and borrower exposures and establishes that trading experienced banks are more likely to 
cut loan supply to exploit investment opportunities in financial markets. 
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custody in other euro area countries and therefore collected by these other euro area countries; however, due to 




observed for OFI and, to a smaller extent, private sector non-euro area investors in 2015 Q2, 
compared to 2014Q1. This was to a large extent driven by a higher valuation of the 
outstanding equity portfolio and not by new (equity) finance provided by less risk averse 
investors, the ultimate goal of monetary policy. Once holding amounts are adjusted for 
valuation effects (not shown), a visible rebalancing towards equity was observed only for 
OFIs, though these holdings represent a negligible share of the overall portfolio of securities. 
It remains therefore to be assessed whether portfolio rebalancing benefitted the supply of 
new credit in the form of bonds. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics, focusing on the sample of debt securities 
issued in the two quarters considered. Large differences are observable in the holding 
amounts, across securities and holding sectors, reflecting heterogeneity in the size of 
issuances and of holding sector portfolios. Portfolio valuation, mh, is the investor specific 
measure of APP shock intensity and is defined as the change in the value of securities held 
by each sector in 2014Q1, before the anticipation of the APP. This measure displays 
significant variation both across institutional sectors and countries. Concerning holding 
sectors, the impact was particularly significant for insurance corporations and pension funds 
and for other financial intermediaries, reflecting the long duration of the securities held by 
these classes of investors. Looking at countries, a noteworthy pattern is that the stronger 
valuation effects are discernible in non-vulnerable countries. This finding, which may come 
as a surprise, is explained by the higher share of equity instruments and of investment fund 
and money market fund participation units in these countries, against a background in which 
the value of these assets was more affected by the APP than that of debt securities. 
Maturities are similar across groups of countries, but show considerable dispersion across 
individual countries and holders. Yields and spreads are higher in more vulnerable countries, 
as expected. 
Table 2 reports similar statistics, for the two periods separately. Some increase in the 
average maturity and in the share of non euro-denominated bond holdings is observable 
between the two periods. Furthermore, not only average yields but also spreads decline, 
which would not be consistent with increased risk taking. However, one needs to take into 




short-term rates and on unit risk premium (for both term and credit risk). This pricing impact 
may hide a rebalancing towards relatively higher yield securities.
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4. Econometric evidence 
4.1 The empirical framework 
The objective of this section is to explore the role played by monetary policy in shaping 
the risk appetite of euro area investors. The empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in the 
exposure to the monetary policy shock in the cross section of investors, measured by the 
impact of the APP on the valuation of the portfolio of securities held at 2014 Q1. 
The approach used to implement this strategy essentially consists in the estimation of a 
regression equation with the following baseline specification: 
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The variable ℎ𝑖,ℎ,𝑡 is the (log) amount of holdings of security with ISIN i by holding 
sector h (e.g. French investment funds), in the two periods considered (t is either 2014 Q1 or 
2015 Q2). 𝑚ℎ is the intensity of the monetary policy shock specific to holding sector h and 
is defined as 𝑚ℎ = 𝑤′ℎ𝑒, where 𝑤ℎ is a vector defining the composition at 2014 Q1 of the 
financial portfolio for investor ℎ and 𝑒 is the vector of the actual variations in the price of 
each security over the period observed. 𝑇𝑡 is a dummy variable identifying the post-
announcement period, 2015 Q2. 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the yield-to-maturity of security i at time t. A positive 
estimate for the coefficient 𝛽1′
′ would indicate that between the two periods investors more 
exposed to the monetary policy shock rebalanced their portfolio towards riskier securities 
more intensely than other holding sectors. 
Although expectations and implementation of APP are plausibly the most important 
drivers of financial asset prices in the period under examination, prices of securities may 
have also changed for other reasons unrelated to APP. This is not problematic for our 
approach. First, the notion of search-for-yield refers to a reduction of yields and does not 
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require the yield to diminish for a specific reason or factor, such as monetary policy. Second, 
the distinction between actual changes in prices and changes related to monetary policy 
matters for the quantification of the its effects but not for the estimation of the coefficient the 
coefficient 𝛽1′
′, at least as long as 𝑚ℎ  can be considered an exogenous regressor. As the 
portfolio composition over which 𝑚ℎ  is computed is the one prevailing before market yields 
declined, it can by definition not be influenced by expectations of quantitative easing (which 
would lead to reverse causality).  
As discussed, on aggregate, portfolio rebalancing can occur only if there is an additional 
supply of risky securities. Given that our objective is to assess the transmission of monetary 
policy on credit we focus on newly issued securities. For each of the two dates considered 
(end 2014 Q1, end 2015 Q2), newly securities are defined as those issued in the preceding 4-
quarters. This is done to smooth out possible seasonality effects and to avoid capturing 
developments specific to a given quarter. This also means that any mechanical relationship 
between changes in valuations and changes in portfolio composition, which would generate 
spurious correlations, is avoided.
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Exploring the granularity of our dataset, we will conduct our estimates by also including 
different sets of fixed effects. These are crucial to be able to control for possible 
unobservable characteristics of the securities or of the holding sector which may blur the 
results. In particular, we can perfectly control for developments in credit risk or financing 
needs that are associated to a given security or issuer.
67
 Indeed, starting from Kwhaia and 
Mian (2008), a recent and growing empirical literature in banking exploits loan-level 
datasets and the fact that borrowers concomitantly borrow from multiple lenders, to run 
estimations including (time specific) borrower fixed effects. Introducing fixed effects for 
each security (in each period) allows us to isolate from credit developments everything 
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portfolio rebalancing. For example, one may plausibly think that retail investors do not optimally adjust their 
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fixed effects (𝑎𝑖,𝑡). We keep this notation as will also show, among the extensions, some estimations conducted 




which is explained by specific instrument or borrower characteristics, irrespectively of 
whether these are time varying, time invariant, observable or not. Therefore, the introduction 
of these fixed effects is the most effective control for credit risk and demand conditions. 
Similarly, with holding sector (time-varying) fixed effects, we can effectively control 
for everything that is specific to a given class of investors and has an impact on the overall 
size of its portfolio. This is important given that different investor categories may 
structurally invest in securities involving different levels of risk.  As 𝑚ℎ may vary only 
across different holding sectors, all regressions are estimated by clustering errors at the level 
of h. 
Search for yield is investigated using the yield to maturity as an encompassing measure 
of risk (𝑟𝑗𝑡), as well as more specific components such as credit risk (spread), maturity risk 
and exchange rate risk. 
4.2 Results for the baseline model 
Table 3 shows the estimation of model 1 for the sample of newly issued securities and 
for different specifications characterized by different types of controls and different sub-
samples. Looking at the first three columns, referring to the estimation for the whole sample, 
it turns out that irrespectively of the specification adopted, the triple interaction is never 
positive and statistically significant.  
As mentioned, heterogeneity could be expected to be significant across investors 
residing in different countries. An obvious breakdown is the one between vulnerable and less 
vulnerable euro area economies. During the sovereign debt crisis financial conditions in 
countries more directly involved have significantly diverged from those of other countries. 
In early 2014, when long-term yields started their declining trend in anticipation of the 
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 For instance, the spread between the yield on domestic 10-year sovereign bonds and the corresponding 
German figure was about 2 p.p. in Italy and Spain, 3 p.p. in Portugal. Spreads on sovereign may be though as a 
lower bound for spreads on corporates, so financial market fragmentation was still sizeable. Sovereign spreads 
started diminishing thereafter and reached minimum levels in March 2015 when they stabilized at smaller but 




These differences may have important implications for portfolio rebalancing, although a 
priori it is not clear in which direction they should affect the intensity of rebalancing. 
Opposite hypotheses can be made. On the one hand, one may conjecture that given the 
already higher level of risk in vulnerable countries, domestic investors would be less inclined 
to take on additional risks. At the same time, interest rates in less vulnerable economies were 
so low and possibly squeezed toward their lower bound (10-year Bund in March 2015 was 
0.2 percent; yields on many shorter term bonds were negative) that in order to search-for-
yield, in a context where most of the securities offer return rates close to nil, one would need 
to distort the portfolio composition to an extent that would be too costly or even impossible 
(e.g. constrained by investment policies). Of course, this reasoning implies some 
fragmentation in financial markets, such that investors in other countries are reluctant to 
invest in the countries which were more affected by the sovereign crisis. These two 
hypotheses have opposite implications on whether one should expect more rebalancing in 
one area or in the other. To gain some insight on this we explore the international coverage 
of our dataset to investigate the behavior of investors by focusing on the two groups 
separately. 
Column 4 of Table 3 shows the OLS specification for the subsample of holding sectors 
residing in vulnerable countries. The coefficient for the triple interaction term is now 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in these countries monetary policy has 
brought about some rebalancing towards risky assets. Results (not shown) for the subsample 
of less vulnerable economies confirm that rebalancing is limited to vulnerable countries.
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As mentioned, this can be interpreted as a sign that in a context of diminishing returns and 
fragmented financial markets, risk balancing is easier in vulnerable economies, where 
securities paying non trivial yields are available. 
The robustness of the result to the introduction of fixed effects for each pair period-
holding sector (column 5) suggests that it is not driven by an increase in the size of the 
portfolio of some sectors which are specialized in investing in more risky securities but 
rather a genuine tilt in asset allocation (it should be noted that these sectors would also likely 
exhibit larger values for mh). More generally, this implies that the result is robust once we 
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 Results for less vulnerable countries are similar to those obtained for the whole sample, both in terms of 




control for any kind of factors affecting the entire portfolio of each holding sector 
considered. 
The coefficient on the triple interaction term remains positive and statistically 
significant also when introducing (time-varying) security fixed-effects together with time-
varying holding-sector fixed effects (column 6). This suggests that the rebalancing observed 
is not exclusively originated by a stronger than usual issuance of risky securities, something 
we may label confidence or credit-demand effect, but it is at least partly induced by an 
intensified desire of (high 𝑚𝑖) investors to increase their holdings of such securities. The 




The documented effects are sizable. As shown in Table 4, based on the coefficients of 
the OLS model, for a sector with a median shock (mi=2.42%) the semi-elasticity of the 
amount of holdings to the level of yield (the percentage change of the amount of holdings of 
a security when its yield increases by one p.p.) increases in the post period by 10 p.p..
 71
 In 
contrast, for a sector almost not exposed to the APP shock (mh=0.46%, 10
th
 percentile of the 
distribution of mh), such semi-elasticity is negative in 2014 Q1 and even slightly diminishes 
in 2015 Q2, possibly reflecting the generalized reduction of spreads (for a given increase in 
yield in post the increase in underlying risk, say the probability of default, is larger than in 
the pre-announcement).  
As discussed above, one interpretation of finding evidence of rebalancing only in more 
vulnerable economies is that investors residing in countries where long term yield are 
squeezed to very low levels may find additional constraints to rebalance to riskier portfolios 
as this would require investing in other economies, which may be problematic in a context 
where home bias is still persistent. In other words, being at the zero-lower bound may be a 
constraint for the rebalancing rather than a factor exacerbating risk taking. 
                                                          
70
 This specification determines a reduction in the number of securities as some of them are held by one 
sector only (this is typical for Germany). 
71
 Note that the OLS is the only specification where an estimate of the level of the coefficient of semi-
elasticity, which summarise asset allocation, can be derived for the different sectors and in the different periods. 
In all the following specifications, where we also introduce fixed effects at the holding sector or at the security 
level, one loses information on the level and can just focus on cross-sectional differences. Accordingly, for 




4.3 Extensions and robustness 
Table 5 repeats the same type of regressions considering only government bonds or 
other securities, respectively. As can be seen, much of the rebalancing documented in Table 
3 takes place within the category of securities issued by the private sector.  
This is relevant as it suggests that the monetary-policy induced increase in risk appetite 
has benefitted mainly the supply of credit to the real economy, which is in line with the 
notion of portfolio rebalancing as a transmission channel of asset purchase programs. At the 
same time, it should be emphasized that only large corporates can issue securities on the 
market and these firms tend to be constrained in their access to credit.
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The level of the yield is a summary measure of the risk involved in investing in a given 
security. It may thus subsume different components, namely credit risk, maturity risk or 
currency risk.
73
 This is explored for more vulnerable economies in Table 6 where the 
variable 𝑟𝑗𝑡 is replaced by three alternative measures of risk: the spread between the yield 
paid by the security and the risk-free rate of a corresponding maturity; the maturity of the 
security (in months); a dummy for non-euro denominated securities. The specification is 
modified so as to include, for each of these risk measures, all possible double- and triple-
interaction terms. 
As shown in Table 6, the results of this exercise suggest that most of the rebalancing is 
driven by increasing investments in securities involving higher credit risk (the only triple 
interaction term with a positive sign and statistically significant is that for the spread). This 
holds across all specifications, irrespectively of the type of fixed effects included. 
One interpretation for the lack of amplified risk taking in terms of maturity is that 
investing in long-term assets is a relatively costly way to search for yield precisely because 
the term structure has flattened (to increase the yield by one p.p. one needs to lengthen the 
maturity by a much bigger amount compared to normal times). Absence of rebalancing 
towards non-euro denominated securities may signal a residual persistent fragmentation of 
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 Note also that this analysis neglects possible rebalancing taking place between these two categories of 
securities. 
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 Investing in non-euro currency involves some currency mismatch for resident investors that typically 
have liabilities denominated in euro. Information on the extent to which investors hedge against this type of 




financial markets that is restraining the allocation of euro area investors. Note that these 
regressions exclude foreign investors who are responsible, together with investment funds, 
for much of the increase in the share of non-euro denominated securities (by definition, for 
them it is not clear whether investing in non-euro represents an increase or a decline in the 
currency mismatch). 
While our focus is primarily on new issuances, we also conduct estimations on the entire 
sample also including seasoned securities. The main purpose of this exercise is not to assess 
the transmission of APP to the real economy, but rather to hint at its implications for 
financial stability, as the overall risk to which investors are exposed obviously needs to be 
measured on the entire portfolio. As shown in Table 7, when controlling for both sets of 
fixed effects, no visible APP-related rebalancing is detected, not even for more vulnerable 
economies (the coefficient for the triple interaction term in columns 3 and 6 is not 
significant). These results suggest that the rebalancing observed in newly issued securities 
was not large enough to modify the overall risk profile of the portfolios of securities held. 
This assessment may, of course, change over time if rebalancing continues in a context of 
persisting low rates. 
A potential concern for identification arises if the behavior of holders was already 
different before the APP and, in particular, if holders that came to be more affected by the 
programme were already rebalancing towards riskier securities before the policy started to be 
anticipated by the markets. In this case one would expect to find a positive triple interaction 
before the policy announcement. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix show that this is not the 
case: there is no positive relationship between changes in the portfolio allocation of different 
sectors in the period from 2013Q4 to 2014Q1 and the extent to which these sectors were then 
affected by monetary policy, not even in vulnerable countries.
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4.4 Portfolio rebalancing in the extensive margin 
The regression set up described in equation (1) is not suitable to explore the extent to 
which APP-related portfolio rebalancing has involved the extensive margin, that is, 
investments in assets issued by issuers toward which the investors were not already exposed 
prior to APP announcements.  
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In order to do so, it is necessary to take into account that the dataset does not include 
observations for triples i,h,t (security, holder, period) for which the amount of holdings is nil 
(irrespectively of the fact that we are taking log-amounts). 
To account for non-reported nil holdings one observation with a nil holding amount is 
added to the dataset for each pair security-holding sector that is absent from the dataset (and 
this for each time period). In order to keep the number of observations manageable, such 
“rectangularisation” of the dataset is based on security categories, or pseudo-securities, 
instead of actual individual securities. We defined about 2,300 categories distinguished by 
different combinations of issuer sector, issuer country, maturity, coupon type, nominal 
currency and rating. 
We then define a dummy-variable identifying new holdings, i.e. security categories held 
in positive amount in 2015 Q2 but not in 2014 Q1. We then drop observations for 2014 Q1 
and estimate a linear probability model for the new holding dummy. We estimate different 
specifications allowing the model to incorporate pseudo-security fixed effects and holding 
sector fixed effects. As the time dimension is lost, the emphasis is now on the coefficient for 
the term of interaction between the security yield ri and the holding sector portfolio valuation 
mh. 
The results are displayed in Table 8, looking at investors in more vulnerable countries 
and showing that, irrespectively of the specification adopted, the coefficient for ri*mh is 
never significant. Therefore, we do not find evidence of APP-related portfolio rebalancing 
leading to investments in new security categories but only within such categories, possibly 
reflecting the presence of some constraints on the investment strategies that investors may 
follow. 
For robustness purposes we conduct the analysis on the intensive margin in the 
rectangularised dataset. Results, displayed in Table 9, confirm the presence of portfolio 
rebalancing. 
4.5 Portfolio rebalancing and lending supply for individual banks 
This section intends to shed some light on the direct link between monetary policy and 
euro area banks’ lending activity. It relies on SHS data collected for the 25 largest euro area 




policy shock (𝑚ℎ), defined as described in Section 4.1. We then investigate the impact of 
this measure on quantities and prices of loans granted to the non-financial private sector. 
Although the small number of banks represents a constraint for the econometric exercise we 
conduct, the dataset is relevant in terms of coverage as it includes a large share of the euro 
area banking system, at around 70% of total assets. 
One observation in the dataset used for these regressions is a pair b-s, where b stands for 
a given bank and s for a given borrowing sector (households and non-financial corporations). 
The dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of loans extended by bank b at the end of 
2015 Q1. The regressions are estimated by also including a set of country fixed effects, as 
controls for (country-wide) credit demand and risk. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level. Table 10 shows that there is a statistically significant relation between the monetary 
policy shock and the growth rate of loans to non-financial private sector (column 1).
75
 The 
results in the second column of the table show that this effect is not statistically different for 
loans to households and to non-financial corporations (NFC), even though the negative 
coefficient suggests that the effect is somewhat weaker for loans to the latter sector.
76
 In 
what concerns geographical patterns, the relationship is found to be significant only for 
banks headquartered in less vulnerable countries. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
bank-specific control variables such as regulatory capital ratios, asset quality, CDS and 
rating (not shown). As such, it should not be driven by differences in the balance sheet 
strength or market perceptions of the risk of banks across jurisdictions.  
We also run similar estimations where the dependent variable is the interest rates 
applied on new loans extended in the four quarters to 2015 Q1. No relationship is found for 
the non-financial private sector as a whole (Table 11, column 1). However, this masks 
underlying differences across sectors. High mh banks are found to decrease the interest rates 
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 For what concerns the security portfolios of banks, we also estimated equation (1) with bank-group data 
and could not find any significant evidence of rebalancing, neither in vulnerable nor in non-vulnerable 
economies (not shown). This reassures about the fact that the results shown above for sector-by-sector holdings 
are not affected by possible (reverse causality) endogeneity issues that could arise if the ECB targeted the 
securities held by banks whose investment portfolio is made preeminently of government bonds, in response to 
anticipations of a rebalancing of their portfolios. Focusing on the case of Italy, Affinito et al. (2016) analyze 
banks’ purchases of domestic government bonds in the years 2007-2013. They conclude that investing in 
sovereign bonds represented, for Italian lenders, a way to support their own balance sheet conditions at a time 
of increasing credit and liquidity risk. 
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 A test for the join-significance of both coefficients in column 2 allows for the rejection of the hypothesis 




applied on loans to households by comparatively more. This is not the case for loans to NFC 
whose interest rate displays, counter-intuitively, a positive relation with mh,, the more so the 
larger the size of the loans The effect of the monetary policy measure on lending rates is not 




The fact that the monetary policy shock is found to be associated with higher growth of 
loans to NFC but not with a comparatively stronger decline in interest rates is consistent with 
the presence of some rebalancing within this borrowing sector towards riskier borrowers.  
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we empirically study whether the APP has induced portfolio-rebalancing. 
As mentioned above, the portfolio rebalancing channel has attracted a lot of attention in the 
public debate, despite the fact that its actual relevance is largely unknown. 
This channel exerts its effects by inducing an increase in risk appetite. While this may 
conceivably pose financial stability risks, whether an increase in risk appetite is desirable or 
not depends on whether the current level of risk taking is below optimum or not. One of the 
main conclusions of our analysis is that the APP-related portfolio rebalancing is statistically 
significant only for asset holders residing in more vulnerable countries, where credit 
conditions are still comparatively tight or, in other words, risk taking is still sub-optimal. 
Regarding the transmission of the APP to the real economy via the portfolio rebalancing 
channel, we obtain a mixed picture. First, we show that the APP-related increase in risk-
taking in vulnerable economies has affected securities issued by corporates (as opposed to 
sovereigns) and has resulted in more credit risk-taking (as opposed to maturity or currency 
risk-taking). However, when looking at lending volumes granted by banks, we obtain 
evidence of effects limited to non-vulnerable countries.  
One possible explanation of these geographical patterns is that in non-vulnerable 
countries spreads were already so compressed to begin with, that in order to reach a given 
increase in the average yield of a given portfolio a dramatic change in its  composition would 
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 In a similar vein to the exercise described in the last paragraph of Section 4.3, Tables A3 and A4 show 
that the there is no positive relationship between the lending behavior of different banks in the period from 






 This could also explain why in these economies some rebalancing of banks 
towards real-sector loans (where presumably spreads are still positive) is detectable. One 
possible explanation for the fact that in vulnerable economies rebalancing has concerned 
financial securities but not loans to the real economy is that some constraints have limited 
the expansion in the supply of bank loans. These could be related to regulatory or 
supervisory activity. Overall, our results do not support the claim that APP poses risks to 
financial stability while, at the same time, they are consistent with the presence of exogenous 
constraints limiting its pass-through to the real economy. 
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 To exemplify, if the yield curve is perfectly flat, then even an arbitrary large increase in average duration 
does not help in raising the average yield. In other words, when comes to search-for yield, both income and 
substitution effects are at play; when spreads are very much compressed, as it is the case in non-stressed 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Portfolio rebalancing between 2014Q1 and 2015Q2 across types of instruments 
 
a) Outstanding amounts (billions of euro) 
 
b) Shares (percentage points) 
 
Notes: The chart shows the investment in each type of instrument by holding sector based on market values.  Excluding non-euro-area residents third-party holdings 
(non-euro area residents holdings reported by euro area NCBs) and non-euro area securities held by non-euro area residents. The category OFI does not include FVCs 
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Descriptive statistics for newly issued securities
 
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N. Obs
Full sample
Holding amount 19.62 157.31 0.20 1.08 6.35 235423
Log (Holding Amount) 0.12 2.55 -1.55 0.11 1.88 232626
Portfolio valuation (mh) 4.12 2.06 3.46 3.89 4.86 235423
Yield-to-maturity 2.96 2.55 1.05 2.60 4.13 235423
Spread it 2.53 2.46 0.69 2.07 3.61 228721
Maturity it 80.64 72.66 36.00 59.00 96.00 228721
NonEur it 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 228721
Vulnerable countries
Holding amount 22.86 217.56 0.26 1.52 6.99 50140
Log (Holding Amount) 0.31 2.40 -1.31 0.44 1.95 49869
Portfolio valuation (mh) 2.69 1.87 2.26 2.42 3.70 50140
Yield-to-maturity 3.20 2.40 1.67 3.15 3.91 50140
Spread it 2.67 2.30 1.07 2.68 3.38 49193
Maturity it 86.92 81.13 37.00 59.00 111.00 49193
NonEur it 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 49193
Less vulnerable countries
Holding amount 18.74 136.49 0.20 1.00 6.10 185283
Log (Holding Amount) 0.07 2.59 -1.59 0.03 1.85 182757
Portfolio valuation (mh) 4.51 1.94 3.70 4.53 5.66 185283
Yield-to-maturity 2.89 2.58 0.88 2.42 4.21 185283
Spread it 2.49 2.50 0.59 1.91 3.71 179528
Maturity it 78.92 70.06 36.00 59.00 95.00 179528
NonEur it 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 179528
Notes: Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Holding amount in EUR millions. Only holdings of
newly issued securities, defined as those issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The t erm 
“vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia.
Yield-to-maturity in percent. Spreadit is the difference at time t between the yield-to-
maturity of security i and the risk-free benchmark rate of a corresponding maturity, in
percent. Maturity it is the residual maturity of security i at time t, in months. NonEur it is a
dummy for securities denominated in currenciues other than the euro. mh is the change in




Table 2  
Descriptive statistics for newly issued securities before and after the shock
 
  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Full sample
Yield-to-maturity 3.23 2.71 2.34 1.80 112159 123264
Spread it 2.65 2.42 1.63 1.41 108880 119841
Maturity it 79 83 93 98 108880 119841
NonEur it 0.38 0.42 0.17 0.23 108880 119841
Vulnerable countries
Yield-to-maturity 3.42 2.96 2.55 1.94 25514 24626
Spread it 2.75 2.58 2.09 1.66 24983 24210
Maturity it 81 93 82 102 24983 24210
NonEur it 0.32 0.36 0.11 0.14 24983 24210
Less vulnerable countries
Yield-to-maturity 3.17 2.65 2.27 1.76 86645 98638
Spread it 2.62 2.38 1.49 1.33 83897 95631
Maturity it 78 80 97 96 83897 95631
NonEur it 0.39 0.43 0.11 0.14 83897 95631
Notes: Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined as
those issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The t erm “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland,
Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. Yield-to-maturity in percent. Spreadit is
the difference at time t between the yield-to-maturity of security i and the risk-free
benchmark rate of a corresponding maturity, in percent. Maturity it is the residual maturity
of security i at time t, in months. NonEur it is a dummy for securities denominated in
currenciues other than the euro. mh is the change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h in
2014 Q1, in percent.




Table 3  
Baseline estimation: newly issued securities  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) -0.0596 -0.0551* -0.0968* -0.0617**
(-1.26) (-1.72) (-1.80) (-2.44)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.122* 0.0915
(-1.85) (1.12)
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.114 0.594
(0.46) (1.59)
r it *m h -0.0200 -0.0195 0.0171 0.0155 0.00118 0.0487***
(-0.95) (-1.54) (1.30) (0.80) (0.09) (2.70)
r it *T t -0.00852 -0.0778 -0.274** -0.319**
(-0.07) (-0.82) (-2.47) (-2.61)
m h *T t -0.0368 -0.0445
(-0.78) (-0.63)
r it *m h *T t -0.00620 0.00718 -0.00175 0.0528** 0.0708** 0.0469*
(-0.20) (0.32) (-0.35) (2.31) (2.37) (1.92)
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
security f.e. No No Yes No No Yes
N 232626 232618 182580 49869 49865 39450
R 2 0.051 0.320 0.558 0.030 0.244 0.635
Notes : Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h ( a given institutional sector in 
a given country), in period t . Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined 
as those issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, in percent. m h 
is the change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h  in 2014 Q1, in percent.  T t  is a dummy for the period 
2015 Q2. In all specifications errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01




Table 4  




2014 Q1 2015 Q2
p10 (0.46) -9.0 -9.3
p25 (2.26) -6.2 3.0
p50 (2.42) -5.9 4.1
p75 (3.70) -3.9 12.8
P90 (4.71) -2.4 19.7
m h
Notes : Percentage variation of holdings for a one p.p. change 
in the yield-to-maturity, conditional on the time period and on 
the portfolio valuation m h . Based on column 4 of Table 3.  The 
term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, 




Table 5  
Investors in vulnerable countries; holdings of newly issued sovereign and corporate bonds
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) 0.0289 -0.148* -0.0829* -0.0489
(0.25) (-1.76) (-1.78) (-1.63)
portfolio valuation (m h ) 0.0937 0.0962
(1.58) (1.01)
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.269* 0.620
(1.83) (1.46)
r it *m h -0.0418 0.000525 0.0314 0.0175 0.00323 0.0518***
(-1.20) (0.03) (1.45) (1.01) (0.24) (2.98)
r it *T t -0.113 -0.219* -0.276** -0.309**
(-1.63) (-1.72) (-2.24) (-2.36)
m h *T t 0.00333 -0.0510
(0.08) (-0.61)
r it *m h *T t 0.0259 0.0524 0.00982 0.0535** 0.0689** 0.0525*
(1.35) (1.58) (0.46) (2.07) (2.11) (1.79)
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
security f.e. No No Yes No No Yes
N 4382 4368 3904 45487 45482 35532
R
2
0.015 0.206 0.567 0.031 0.258 0.648
Sovereign Bonds Corporate bonds
Notes : Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h ( a given institutional sector in 
a given country), in period t . Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined 
as those issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, in percent. m h 
is the change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h  in 2014 Q1, in percent.  T t  is a dummy for the period 
2015 Q2. In all specifications errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.




Table 6  




portfolio valuation (m h ) 0.177 (1.61)
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.452 (1.46)
Spread it -0.132* (-1.98) -0.0330 (-1.17)
Maturity it 0.00391 (0.99) 0.00232 (0.70)
NonEur it -1.005** (-2.22) -1.437*** (-5.35)
m h *T t -0.0326 (-0.61)
Spread it *m h 0.0359* (1.68) 0.00739 (0.63) 0.0230 (1.15)
Maturity it *m h -0.00111 (-1.23) -0.000928 (-1.24) -0.0000211 (-0.07)
NonEur it *m h 0.0432 (0.40) 0.0111 (0.20) 0.0525 (0.48)
Spread it *Tt -0.262** (-2.34) -0.256* (-1.91)
Maturity it *Tt -0.000737 (-0.75) 0.0000207 (0.03)
NonEurit*Tt 0.384* (1.82) 0.673*** (2.84)
Spread it *m h *Tt 0.0529** (2.31) 0.0571* (1.87) 0.0435* (1.83)
Maturity it *m h *Tt 0.000179 (0.72) 0.0000614 (0.41) -0.0000783 (-0.58)








Notes: Dep. variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h (a given institutional sector in a given 
country), in period t. Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined as those 
issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, 
Portugal and Slovenia. Spreadit is the difference at time t between the yield-to-maturity of security i and the risk-
free benchmark rate of a corresponding maturity, in percent. Maturity it  is the residual maturity of security i  at 
time t, in months. NonEur it  is a dummy for securities denominated in currenciues other than the euro. mh is the 
change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h in 2014 Q1, in percent.  Tt is a dummy for the period 2015 Q2. In all 
specifications errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.












Table 7  





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) -0.0733** -0.0695*** 0.0167 -0.00149
(-2.58) (-2.77) (0.38) (-0.11)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.0802 0.0556
(-1.31) (0.77)
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.184 0.307*
(1.55) (1.80)
r it *m h -0.0192** -0.0219*** 0.0139 -0.0409*** -0.0305*** 0.0406***
(-2.01) (-2.74) (1.27) (-2.82) (-6.87) (3.94)
r it *T t -0.0966* -0.124*** -0.149*** -0.151** -456.7
(-1.77) (-2.83) (-2.72) (-2.39) (-0.00)
m h *T t -0.0326 -0.0115
(-1.41) (-0.33)
r it *m h *T t 0.0146 0.0213** 0.000476 0.0297** 0.0326* -0.00772
(1.24) (2.16) (0.12) (2.29) (1.96) (-1.60)
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
security*time f.e. No No Yes No No Yes
N 957680 957677 800033 249374 249372 190264
R 2 0.037 0.226 0.509 0.020 0.182 0.590
Full sample Investors in vulnerable countries
Notes : Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h ( a given institutional sector in 
a given country), in period t . Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, 
in percent. m h  is the change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h  in 2014 Q1, in percent.  T t  is a dummy 
for the period 2015 Q2. In all specifications errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-statistics in 
parentheses.




Table 8  
Investors in vulnerable countries; extensive margin  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) 0.00886* 0.0105***
(2.40) (3.17)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.00176 -0.00354
(-0.44) (0.74)
r it *m h -0.00101 -0.00141 -0.000412 -0.0000575
(-0.76) (-0.95) (-0.41) (-0.06)
pseudo-security f.e. No Yes No Yes
holder f.e. No No Yes Yes
N 15179 14956 15179 14956
R 2 0.002 0.326 0.074 0.44
Notes : The sample is restricted to securities held in 2015Q2. The dependent variable 
identifies new holdings, i.e. conditional on being held in 2015Q2, securities which 
were not also held in 2014Q1, for each sector h ( a given institutional sector in a given 
country). The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. The dataset is rectangularised in order to account for 
the fact that non-reported holdings actually represent zero holdings. In order to keep 
the number of observations manegable, securities are grouped into around 2300 
categories according to issuer sector, issuer country, maturity, coupon type, nominal 
currency and rating. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, in 
percent. m h  is the change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h  in 2014 Q1, in 
percent.  In all specifications errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-
statistics in parentheses.




Table 9  





(1) (2) (3) (5) (5) (6) (7) (8)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) -0.138*** -0.130*** -0.0955*** -0.0701***
(-6.13) (-6.96) (-4.46) (-4.30)
portfolio valuation (m h ) 0.0503* 0.0944***
-1.68 -4.21
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.118*** 0.11
-3.01 -1.6
r it *m h -0.00275 -0.0048 -0.00501 -0.00328 0.0006 -0.00640* -0.00658 -0.00574
(-0.74) (-1.57) (-1.50) (-1.20) -0.09 (-1.70) (-1.53) (-0.83)
r it *T t -0.0496*** -0.0263** -0.0365** -0.0151
(-4.68) (-2.56) (-2.35) (-1.31)
m h *T t -0.012 -0.0386*
(-1.38) (-1.71)
r it *m h *T t 0.00414* 0.00153 0.0013 0.00510** 0.0117** 0.00397 0.003 0.00789**
(1.91) (0.75) (0.57) (2.40) (2.47) (1.37) (0.94) (2.58)
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-security*time f.e. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
holder*issuer f.e. No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 103402 103400 102957 74294 30817 30816 30340 21094
R
2
0.022 0.334 0.525 0.93 0.041 0.314 0.545 0.928
Full sample Investors in vulnerable countries
Notes: Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h (a given institutional sector in a given country), in 
period t. Data for 2014Q1 and 2015Q2. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined as those issued in the preceeding 4 
quarters. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. The dataset is 
rectangularised in order to account for the fact that non-reported holdings actually represent zero holdings. In order to keep the 
number of observations manegable, securities are grouped into around 2300 categories according to issuer sector, issuer country, 
maturity, coupon type, nominal currency and rating. rit is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, in percent. mh is the 
change in valuation of the portfolio of sector h in 2014 Q1, in percent.  Tt is a dummy for the period 2015 Q2. In all specifications 
errors are clustered at the holding-sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.




Table 10  
Portfolio valuation and credit growth  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
portfolio valuation (m h ) 1.633** 2.335** 2.797*** 3.527***
(2.75) (2.68) (4.03) (3.57)
m h *Loans to Non Financial Corporations -1.405 -1.460
(-1.04) (-0.92)
m h *Vulnerable countries -3.262*** -3.429***
(-3.64) (-3.72)
m h *L NFC *Vulnerable countries 0.335
(0.17)
sector f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
country f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 50 50 50 50
R 2 0.402 0.422 0.463 0.483
Notes : Dependent variable is y-o-y growth of loans to households and to non-financial 
corporations granted by bank h in 2015Q2. The interaction term Loans to non-financial 
corporations  is a dummy-variable identifying observations for this sector (so that households 
becomes the baseline). m h  is the change in valuation between 2015Q2 and 2014Q1 of the 
portfolio held by bank h  in 2014 Q1, in percent. In all specifications errors are clustered at the 
bank level. t-statistics in parentheses.




Table 11  
Portfolio valuation and interest rates on loans  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
portfolio valuation (m h ) 0.034 -0.250* -0.250* 0.016 -0.271*** -0.271**
(0.72) (-1.77) (-1.75) (0.40) (-2.81) (-2.75)
m h *Loans to Non Financial Corporations 0.378** 0.383***
(2.46) (3.13)
m h *Loans to NFC up to € 0.25 million 0.324* 0.320**
(1.92) (2.35)
m h *Loans to NFC above € 0.25 and up to € 1 million 0.378** 0.413***
(2.28) (2.95)
m h *Loans to NFC above € 1 million 0.433*** 0.414***
(3.02) (3.70)
m h *Vulnerable countries 0.05 0.071 0.071
(0.44) (0.24) (0.23)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC -0.027
(-0.09)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  up to € 0.25 million 0.021
(0.05)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  above € 0.25 and up to € 1 million -0.217
(-0.63)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  above to € 1 million 0.115
(0.44)
sector f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 100 100 100 100 100 100
R
2
0.315 0.455 0.463 0.317 0.457 0.483
Notes : Dependent variable is the change in the interest rates on new loans applied by bank h between 2015Q2 and 2014Q1. m h  is the 
change in valuation between 2015Q2 and 2014Q1 of the portfolio held by bank h  in 2014 Q1, in percent. In all specifications errors are 
clustered at the bank level. t-statistics in parentheses.










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) -0.0504 -0.0647** -0.0998* -0.0928***
(-1.21) (-2.29) (-1.99) (-4.15)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.120* 0.0506
(-1.87) -0.69
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.0452 0.000143
-0.69 0
r it *m h -0.0134 -0.0108 0.0122 0.021 0.0175* 0.0281** 
(-0.83) (-1.03) -1.12 -1.09 -1.84 -2.29
r it *T t 0.00554 0.0221** 0.0164 0.0389***
-0.38 -2.27 -0.94 -3.49
m h *T t 0.00452 0.0466*
-0.31 -1.71
r it *m h *T t -0.00692 -0.00847*** 0.00208 -0.00744 -0.0159*** 0.0118
(-1.52) (-3.14) -0.56 (-1.28) (-4.83) -1.09
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
security f.e. No No Yes No No Yes
N 216898 216887 172160 49980 49975 39843
R 2 0.034 0.288 0.546 0.011 0.235 0.642
Full sample Investors in vulnerable countries
Notes : Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h ( a given institutional sector in 
a given country), in period t . Data for 2013Q4 and 2014Q1. Only holdings of newly issued securities, defined 
as those issued in the preceeding 4 quarters. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, in percent. m h 
is the change between 2014 Q1 and 2015 Q2 in valuation of the portfolio held by sector h in 2014 Q1, in 
percent.  T t  is a dummy for the period 2014 Q1. In all specifications errors are clustered at the holding-
sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yield-to-maturity (r it ) -0.0559** -0.0700*** 0.0175 -0.0239
(-2.32) (-3.16) -0.46 (-1.37)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.0713 0.0184
(-1.24) -0.3
post-APP period dummy (T t ) 0.0104 -0.0343
-0.36 (-0.74)
r it *m h -0.0197** -0.0174** 0.0103 -0.0384*** -0.0195*** 0.0210*
(-2.50) (-2.58) -1.08 (-2.93) (-3.53) -1.8
r it *T t 0.00241 0.0163*** 0.00261 0.0220**
-0.31 -2.93 -0.18 -2.31
m h *T t 0.000872 0.0343*
-0.14 -1.99
r it *m h *T t -0.00135 -0.00481*** 0.001 0.00116 -0.00607** 0.0021
(-0.53) (-3.16) -0.46 -0.25 (-2.13) -0.53
holder*time f.e. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
security f.e. No No Yes No No Yes
N 894714 894709 745334 243120 243117 183738
R 2 0.029 0.214 0.507 0.015 0.181 0.592
Full sample Investors in vulnerable countries
Notes : Dependent variable is log of the amounts of security i held by sector h ( a given institutional sector in 
a given country), in period t . Data for 2013Q4 and 2014Q1. The term “vulnerable countries” refers to Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia. r it is the yield-to-maturity of the corresponding securitiy, 
in percent. m h  is the change between 2014 Q1 and 2015 Q2 in valuation of the portfolio held by sector h in 
2014 Q1, in percent.  T t  is a dummy for the period 2014 Q1. In all specifications errors are clustered at the 
holding-sector level. t-statistics in parentheses.





Portfolio valuation and credit growth before the APP 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
portfolio valuation (m h ) 1.479 1.766 1.537 1.866
(1.32) (1.15) (0.88) (0.87)
m h *Loans to Non Financial Corporations -0.573 -0.659
(-0.42) (-0.53)
m h *Vulnerable countries -0.163 -0.422
(-0.09) (-0.18)
m h *L NFC *Vulnerable countries 0.519
(0.19)
sector f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
country f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 50 50 50 50
R 2 0.270 0.272 0.270 0.272
Notes : Dependent variable is y-o-y growth of loans to households and to non-financial 
corporations granted by bank h in 2014Q1. The interaction term Loans to non-financial 
corporations  is a dummy-variable identifying observations for this sector (so that households 
becomes the baseline). m h  is the change in valuation between 2015Q2 and 2014Q1 of the 
portfolio held by bank h  in 2014 Q1, in percent. In all specifications errors are clustered at the 
bank level. t-statistics in parentheses.





Portfolio valuation and interest rates on loans before the APP 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
portfolio valuation (m h ) -0.0217 -0.0631 -0.0631 -0.0366 -0.0647 -0.0647
(-0.48) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.45) (-0.44)
m h *Loans to Non Financial Corporations 0.0552 0.0374
(0.50) (0.33)
m h *Loans to NFC up to € 0.25 million 0.0903 0.0850
(0.86) (0.77)
m h *Loans to NFC above € 0.25 and up to € 1 million 0.0807 0.0698
(0.66) (0.55)
m h *Loans to NFC above € 1 million -0.00535 -0.0425
(-0.05) (-0.35)
m h *Vulnerable countries 0.0418 -0.0393 -0.0393
(0.54) (-0.34) (-0.34)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC 0.108
(0.79)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  up to € 0.25 million 0.0321
(0.31)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  above € 0.25 and up to € 1 million 0.0663
(0.54)
m h *Vulnerable countries*L NFC  above to € 1 million 0.226
(0.69)
sector f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 100 100 100 100 100 100
R
2
0.118 0.121 0.127 0.119 0.124 0.138
Notes : Dependent variable is the change in the interest rates on new loans applied by bank h between 2014Q1 and 2013Q4. m h  is the 
change in valuation between 2015Q2 and 2014Q1 of the portfolio held by bank h  in 2014 Q1, in percent. In all specifications errors are 
clustered at the bank level. t-statistics in parentheses.





This dissertation provides some insights on key aspects of bank behaviour and, more 
generally, provision of credit to the real economy. 
The main findings of the first chapter are that the voluntary capital buffers held by banks 
in excess of the regulatory minimum are positively influenced by several broad risk 
measures, whereas provisions and high and stable profitability are found to be substitutes for 
capital buffers. Larger banks seem to hold less excess capital and capital buffers tend to be 
lower in times of stronger economic growth. 
The analysis in the second chapter concludes that the Portuguese banking system has 
experienced weak competition between 1991 and 1996, underwent a period of restructuring 
until 2000, and from then until 2004 behaved consistently with perfect competition. Both 
privately owned and, more markedly, domestic banks, seem to have competed more 
aggressively on occasions. 
The third chapter concludes that technological progress has shifted Portuguese banks’ 
cost frontier downwards between 1992 and 2006, whereas the distance at which banks have 
operated from the frontier seems to have remained constant. Increases in production under 
scale economies have also contributed to the recorded increase in productivity. 
The results of the fourth chapter suggest that portfolio rebalancing has been an active 
channel of transmission of the ECB’s expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP), though 
with important differences across countries. In countries which were more directly affected 
by the recent financial crisis there is evidence that the APP led to a rebalancing of portfolios 
towards riskier securities, in particular impacting securities issued by corporates (as opposed 
to sovereigns) and resulting in increased credit risk-taking (as opposed to maturity or 
currency risk-taking). However, evidence of effects on bank lending is limited to other 
countries. One possible explanation for these geographical patterns is that in less vulnerable 
countries spreads were already so compressed that reaching a significant increase in the 
average yield of a given portfolio would an unfeasibly large change in its composition.  This 
could also explain why in these economies some rebalancing of banks towards real-sector 
loans (where presumably spreads are still positive) is found.  
 
